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Abstract
Three Essays on Political Regimes, Military Spending, and Economic Growth

Pavel A. Yakovlev
This dissertation is a collection of essays on the issues in political and defense economics.
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the role that political and institutional arrangements play
in affecting government policy and economic well-being. The second chapter examines how
different political regimes and military manpower systems affect the value of life in military
conflicts. The results in Chapter 2 show that democracies suffer lower battlefield casualties than
dictatorships. Also noteworthy is that more volunteer based armies, per capita income, and
economic freedom lead to lower battlefield deaths. Thus, political and economic liberties are
found to increase the value of life in military conflicts. Chapter 3 investigates how arms trade
and military spending affect economic growth. The results indicate that higher military spending
and net arms exports lead, separately, to lower economic growth, but higher military spending
appears to be less detrimental to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. The fourth
chapter examines the relationship between incumbency advantage and legislative shirking or
ideology. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage leads to more legislative shirking
as evidenced by the departure of politicians from the median voter’s ideological preferences.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the dissertation, provides concluding remarks, and
discusses opportunities for future research in the political economy of warfare.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction to the Political Economy of Conflict, Military Spending, and
Legislative Shirking
1.1 Introduction
Political economy is a subfield of economics that analyzes the interactions between political
institutions and economic policies. Political and economic processes have long been considered
intertwined. Scholarly research shows that political and legal institutions are significantly
correlated with economic development and well-being. For instance, Persson (2002) finds
empirical evidence consistent with the theory that different political regimes have a significant
influence on fiscal policy, welfare, and corruption. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find
that when economic and demographic variables are taken into account, democracies and nondemocracies differ significantly in military spending, torture, execution, censorship, and
religious regulation. Thus, the importance and relevance of academic research in the field of
political economy is clear.
It is crucial to understand how economic and political forces interact together in order to
make the world a better place via wise governance. In the following chapter, I extend the frontier
of knowledge in the field of political economy by analyzing: (1) how different political regimes
affect the value of life in military conflicts, (2) how military spending and arms trade affect
economic growth, and (3) how elected officials deal with the tradeoff between their self-interest
and reelection incentives when legislating constituents' preferences. In other words, my research
examines how different political regimes and politicians' incentives affect government policy
and, in turn, public well-being. The latter can be manifested in a variety of ways, ranging from
higher standards of living to lower battlefield casualties.
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1.2 Political Regimes and Military Conflicts
The humanitarian and economic costs of conflicts can be astronomical. For this reason, humanity
remains engaged in a struggle to prevent conflicts from occurring. This undertaking warrants a
better understanding of what causes conflicts and how to prevent them or to lessen their burdens.
A few researchers have discovered that geopolitical and economic factors may affect conflict
initiations, payoffs, and outcomes. Filson and Werner (2004), for instance, develop a formal
model of conflict showing that democratic regimes are sensitive to the institutional constraints
and costs of war. They argue that this sensitivity affects the propensity of democratic regimes to
accept negotiated settlements over wars and leads to the often noted tendency for democracies to
select to fight low-cost, short wars that they can win. Garfinkel (1994) arrives at a similar
conclusion for democracies by showing that political party competition, in association with
electoral uncertainty, can reduce military spending and the severity of conflict between nations.
Gartzke (2005), on the other hand, finds that economic freedom is fifty times more potent than
political freedom in promoting peace.
The works of the above scholars in political economy inspired me to study how political
and economic factors may affect the level of casualties in a given conflict. Taking my own
approach, I develop a theoretical model to analyze whether democracies and dictatorships, with
volunteer or conscription armies, value life differently from one another when they are involved
in military conflicts. My model yields formal theoretical insights into how economic and
institutional factors may affect military capital intensity and subsequent combat casualties. The
empirical evidence presented in this dissertation supports the model's prediction that more
democratic nations with volunteer armies experience lower conflict casualties owing to their
higher military capital intensity. I also find that higher reliance on conscription leads to lower
military capital intensity, whereas higher real GDP per capita leads to higher military capital
intensity. Moreover, I find that economic freedom is thirteen times more potent than political
2

freedom in increasing military capital intensity and saving more lives. One of my intriguing
findings suggests that political and economic freedoms converge in the strength of their
respective impacts on military capital intensity.

1.3 “Guns vs. Butter” Debate Revisited
Given the findings cited above that democracies tend to have higher defense expenditure per
soldier than non-democracies, it would be worthwhile to examine how political regimes
influence military spending and arms trade, which could have significant implications for
economic growth. There is a large literature on the relationship between economic growth and
military spending, but its findings are mixed and largely inconclusive. Some researchers find that
military spending is positively related to growth, while others find the opposite result. This
disagreement on the effect of military spending could stem partly from the non-linear growth
effects of military expenditure and incorrect model specifications. Addressing these problems
and controlling for country differences in political regimes and arms trade could improve our
understanding of the complex issues involved in this debate. The interplay of military spending
and arms trade, for instance, could have a priori unpredictable effect on growth.
My research could bring new evidence to the debate on the growth effects of military
spending, or the "butter vs. guns" tradeoff. In Chapter 3, I investigate the non-linear effects of
military spending and arms trade on economic growth using the Solow and Barro growth models
as recommended by Dunne et al. (2005). The empirical evidence indicates that military spending
and arms exports have a significant negative effect on economic growth, but higher military
spending is less detrimental to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. I also find
that democracy is inversely related to the size of military expenditure as a share of GDP,
providing at least some explanation for why democratic regimes and per capita incomes appear
to be correlated.
3

1.4 The Incumbency Advantage and Legislative Shirking
Economists identify two legitimate reasons to justify government intervention: (1) the
enforcement of law and property rights and (2) the provision of public goods that a free market
may fail to provide. Many governments around the world, however, take on more responsibilities
than are considered legitimate by economists. In a representative democracy, elected officials are
expected to act responsibly in enacting the preferences of their citizens. However, as is the case
with the inefficient provision of public goods in a free market, the government itself may also be
inefficient at providing these goods and services to its citizens. Think of voters as customers, and
their elected officials as firms. This way, all of us can be thought of as operating in a market of
some sort, the electoral market, in which our decisions are guided by self interest and some
constraints. Voters, acting as customers, shop around for the best offers made by politicians, who
are acting as competitive firms in this electoral market. Under the ideal conditions, this market
would function efficiently; voters would elect the best politicians to enact the most preferred
policies. If some of these ideal conditions are violated, then the efficient outcomes in the
electoral markets may not be achieved. In a world of less than perfect competition, politicians
may find it optimal to enact their own ideological preferences or to sell their votes to interest
groups rather than to represent the interests of their constituents. Since information is costly,
voters choose to be rationally ignorant, which makes it difficult for them to monitor and asses the
performance of their elected representatives. This means that politicians do not have as much
pressure to do their best, and they might find it possible to shirk on the job and still get reelected.
Moreover, if incumbent politicians enjoy some kind of advantage over their challengers, then
they are more likely to remain in office and to continue to shirk.
Does this kind of shirking really happen? Does the incumbency advantage really increase
legislative shirking? These are the kind of questions I ask and try to answer in Chapter 4 of my
4

dissertation. In this chapter, I develop and test the principal-agent model, in which political
agents seeking reelection face a tradeoff between pursuing their own ideological preferences (i.e.
shirking) and adhering to the preferences of their constituents. Using the aggregate elections data
for the U.S. House of Representatives, I find evidence supporting the claim that the incumbency
advantage reduces the tradeoff between shirking and reelection prospects for incumbents. My
findings suggest that if voters expect their elected officials to enact the optimal policy, whether it
is the size of military spending or something else, politicians may find it optimal to enact a
policy that is closer to their own preferences instead of those of their voters.

5

Chapter 2
Do Democracies and Dictatorships Value Life Differently in Military
Conflicts?

2.1 Introduction
There exists a rich literature devoted to studying conflict and related issues of imperative
economic and humanitarian importance. In a survey of selected contributions to the economic
analysis of conflict, Sandler (2000) points out the diversity and depth of issues that have been
addressed by scholars. Yet, the contemporary economic literature seems to lack a rigorous
theoretical and empirical analysis of how different political, institutional, and economic factors
may affect the value of life and the size of combat casualties in military conflicts.
This paper develops a theoretical model of warfare that provides insights into how
different political regimes and military manpower systems may affect the relative value (price)
of military personnel, capital intensity of military forces, and total combat casualties. I argue that
democracies should have more capital intensive militaries than dictatorships because of the reelection incentives to incur less combat casualties. As a result, more democratic nations suffer
fewer battlefield deaths compared to less democratic nations. In light of the recent work by
Gartzke (2005), who finds that economic freedom is fifty times more potent than democracy in
promoting peace, I also analyze the effect of economic freedom (index developed by Gwartney
and Lawson 2004) on battlefield deaths.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper supports the model’s predictions that
democracies value life more in military conflicts than dictatorships. A heavier reliance on
conscription in acquiring military manpower leads to lower capital intensity, while higher real
GDP per capita leads to higher capital intensity of military forces. I find that economic freedom
is as much as thirteen times more potent than democracy in generating more capital intensive
6

military forces, leading to lower total battlefield deaths. Thus, the empirical evidence shows that
political regimes and military manpower systems are still the significant determinants of value of
life even after controlling for economic factors.

2.2 Literature Review
Most of the contemporary research on conflict and peace has been focused on the rational
approach to studying conflict. Rational conflict theory postulates that warfare becomes an
attractive dispute instrument when property rights are poorly defined and poorly enforced. In his
book, Arms and Influence, Schelling (1966) argues that nations with complete information
should never go to war because a peaceful settlement is less costly than a conflict. What is
puzzling about conflicts, however, is that they may occur despite the possibility of having
complete information and mutually superior peaceful bargains. Hirschleifer (1995) contends that
anarchy is especially susceptible to conflict unless there are strongly diminishing returns to
fighting and incomes exceed the viability minimum. Fearon (1995) suggests that bargains may
not occur because of commitment problems due to incentives to renege on the bargain terms,
issue indivisibilities (such as to legalize or not to legalize abortion), private information about
relative military capabilities or resolve, and incentives to misrepresent such information.
Moreover, Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) demonstrate that conflict could be the rational
equilibrium outcome if the long-run gains from defeating an opponent outweigh the short-run
losses.
A number of researchers have also discovered that geographical, institutional, and
economic factors may affect conflict initiations, payoffs, and outcomes. For instance, Filson and
Werner (2004) develop a formal model of conflict showing that democratic regimes are sensitive
to the institutional constraints and war costs. They argue that this sensitivity entices democratic
regimes to accept negotiated settlements over wars and choose to fight only low cost and short
7

wars that they can win. Garfinkel (1994) arrives at a similar conclusion for democracies by
showing that political party competition associated with electoral uncertainty can reduce military
spending and the severity of conflict between nations. Similarly, Mitchell et. al. (1999) find
support for the propositions that democratization decreases the systemic amount of war in
addition to having a pacifying effect on war that increases over time. Biddle and Long (2004)
find that factors like superior human capital, harmonious civil-military relations, and Western
cultural background are highly correlated with democracies and are largely responsible for
democracy's apparent military effectiveness.
On the other hand, Hess and Orphanides (2001) show how economic recessions and
president’s desire for re-election can instigate an otherwise avoidable war in order to show off
president’s military prowess. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002), on the other hand, find that income
inequality and pervasive rent-seeking by the ruling elites may lead to war and state violence. In
his recent work, Gartzke (2005) shows that economic freedom is a much more potent
determinant of peace than democracy. Gartzke (2005) finds that economic freedom is fifty times
more potent in encouraging peace than democracy, which is a strong evidence for capitalism
driven peace.
From a more general political economy perspective, there is still much to learn about how
political regimes and institutions relate to economic development and well-being. For instance,
Persson (2002) finds empirical evidence consistent with the theory that different political
regimes have a significant influence on government size, welfare-state programs, and corruption.
Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find that when economic and demographic variables are
taken into account, democracies do not differ significantly from non-democracies in affecting
economic or social policies, but they do differ significantly in military spending, torture,
execution, censorship, and religious regulation.

8

Considering the above findings, one might expect political regimes and military
manpower systems (volunteer vs. conscription) to be among the significant determinants of
military capital intensity and corresponding conflict casualties. The theoretical and empirical
search for determinants of conflict casualties is well warranted, which sets the stage for the
construction of this paper.

2.3 Theoretical Model
Intuitively, an ill-equipped (labor intensive) army should have higher combat casualties when
fighting against a well-equipped (capital intensive) army, everything else being equal. Warfare
entails a production of some kind of fighting or military output that requires a constrained choice
of labor, capital, and technology. This choice is tempted by conflict payoffs and constrained by
conflict costs. Thus, a warfare profit function seems like a well suited theoretical foundation for
analyzing the optimal choice of capital and labor needed for warfare. The tricky part is how to
incorporate the possible influence of political regimes and military manpower systems on the
optimal choice of military capital and labor. Incorporating this influence would allow us to
examine the relative value of life and the size of combat casualties being driven by differences in
military capital intensity (i.e. capital-labor ratio) under democracy and dictatorship.
Looking for theoretical elegance and simplicity, I try to model only how the essential
differences between democracy and dictatorship, as well as conscription and volunteer armies,
may affect military capital intensity and consequent combat casualties. I investigate how the
relative value of labor (military personnel) varies between these four scenarios: (1) dictatorship
with volunteer army, (2) dictatorship with conscription army, (3) democracy with volunteer
army, and (4) democracy with conscription army. Each scenario works as if one would insert a
given political regime and military manpower institution into the same hypothetical country to
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compare and contrast the resulting changes in the relative value of military personnel and
military’s capital to labor ratio.
I assume that dictators in this model are able to capture at least some rewards from a
successful war so that their incentives are aligned with maximizing warfare profits for given
labor and capital costs. Arguably, dictators or autocratic governments in general, may perceive
warfare or military build up in itself as a means of self-enrichment or rent seeking (Sandler,
2000). Conversely, I assume that democratically elected leaders represent the preferences of the
median voter and that the threat of being voted out of office keeps the elected officials in
alignment with the vote maximizing political platform. In other words, democratically elected
leaders maximize warfare profits on behalf of their constituents, who care about conflict benefits
and costs. 1 Overall, the only differences that might exist in all four scenarios must come from
political or military manpower systems.
Each decision maker in any of the four scenarios is assumed to be fighting separately
some hypothetical enemy nation, rebel force, terrorist group, or a coalition of these. How
successful the four decision makers are in capturing the disputed asset or conflict objective
depends on their respective fighting effort Y compared to their enemy’s fighting effort YE. The
respective fighting efforts of both warring sides can be combined together into some general
functional form Q(Y, YE). This function could be thought of as the general functional form of the
Contest Success Function (CSF) that is used extensively in the literature to specify how
appropriative contest efforts lead to an appropriative contest outcome (Hirshleifer, 1995). If
fighting an enemy coalition, the assumed general form CSF can be expressed as Q(Y, Y1E, Y2E,…,
YnE).

1

Perhaps this dichotomous modeling of the differences between democracy and dictatorship is unrealistic since even
dictatorships must have some public support (arguably much lower than in democracy) to avoid an uprising.
However, this dichotomy allows for elegant theoretical conclusions without missing the main point that the two
regimes differ in the extent to which they follow the preferences of their constituents.
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Fighting effort Y is some production function with assumed constant returns to scale
(CRS) in capital and labor. It can be written as Y=F(A, K, L), where A is the exogenous
productivity parameter or technological constant, K is capital, and L is labor or military
personnel. To simplify the analysis, capital and labor are assumed to be homogenous in ability,
effort, and preferences and can be substituted for each other continuously. The hypothetical
enemy nation, rebel, or terrorist group has its own fighting effort function labeled as YE=FE(AE,
KE, LE) that is subject to the same properties. I assume that there is no uncertainty and that all
decision makers have perfect information about each other’s military capabilities or fighting
efforts. That is, the enemy’s combat output is known to the decision maker and is held constant
when maximizing warfare profit.
The supply of labor (soldiers) and capital (weapons) is assumed to be perfectly elastic so
that any amount of labor and capital can be hired at the given prices determined in perfectly
competitive factor markets. 2 I assume that military volunteers can only be recruited by paying
them the competitive market wage that fully reflects the risk and opportunity cost of this choice.
Conscription is assumed to work as a random military draft that selects the necessary amount of
conscripts. A conscription based army, by its principle, should pay its soldiers a conscription
wage that is lower than the wage paid in a volunteer army. I assume that factor markets priced in
all the risk preferences and private costs (except for externalities) for a given military conflict.
The value or size of the contested asset or conflict objective is assumed to be fixed
throughout the war. Fighting or warfare in this model serves merely as a means of achieving or
capturing some objective (asset) with a known and certain payoff for a given level of enemy
resistance. The conflict objective can be virtually anything: from capturing natural resources and
land to “establishing democracy” in the opponents’ country. However, the necessary provision

2

Wages could be made endogenous in military output, which would reinforce the exogenous-wage model’s
predictions, but make them unnecessarily complex as well.
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for reaching the conflict objective might require the elimination of enemy resistance, say,
measured in enemy combatants killed. Thus, if both parties’ fighting efforts Y and YE are
measured in the same units (say combat losses), then a more specific functional form, like the
ratio-based Contest Success Function (CSF), could be used instead of the general Q(Y, YE)
warfare functional form. For example, in a two-party contest, fighting efforts by each side (F1
and F2) can be combined together in the following ratio form.
F1m
p1 = m
F1 + F2m

and

F2m
p 2 = 1 − p1 = m
F1 + F2m

Where p1 and p2 can be interpreted as the respective proportions of the prize won in a
continuum, two-party conflict model. In this representation, military conflict is a continuous
zero-sum game. In a two-party model of conflict, p1 and p2 can be interpreted as the respective
probabilities of victory. According to Hirshleifer (1995), the parameter m in the CSF can be
thought of as a decisiveness coefficient, which represents the degree to which greater fighting
efforts translate into battlefield success. Setting m=1 makes this ratio based CSF concave with
monotonically diminishing marginal returns throughout the entire [0, 1] continuum.
However, I shall use some general form contest function as to make the model flexible
enough to address a variety of conflicts: from conventional interstate warfare to fighting
asymmetric wars against terrorists who try to achieve some political or resource transfer
objectives (Enders and Sandler 1995). This general contest function can always assume some
specific functional form that is better suited for a given conflict. Hirshleifer (2000) provides a
good description of various contest success functions. The advantage of using the profit function
as a theoretical framework in this paper is that it allows us to derive the familiar first order
conditions of profit maximization that can be used to infer how political and military manpower
institutions can affect military capital intensity, which in turn can affect the total number of
casualties in military conflicts.
12

2.4 Four Theoretical Scenarios
SCENARIO 1: DICTATORSHIP WITH VOLUNTEER ARMY

Consider the first scenario where the assumed hypothetical country is a dictatorship with a
volunteer army. There are still countries like Cameroon, Rwanda, and Uganda, for example, with
very low democracy scores and heavy reliance on volunteer armed forces. While this scenario is
not the most common around the world, theoretically it is the simplest case to begin with. A
dictator chooses the profit maximizing level of fighting effort or output in a given conflict with a
given payoff pDic, enemy resistance effort YE, volunteer wage wV, and capital rent r.

Max π VDic = p Dic Q(Y , Y E ) − rK − wV L

(1.1)

K ,L

Where Q(Y , Y E ) is the general form CSF, Y=F(A, K, L) and YE=FE(AE, KE, LE) are the
respective fighting effort or production functions of the two contesting parties, L and K are labor
and capital. From now on forward assume that FL > 0, FLL ≤ 0, FK > 0, FKK ≤ 0 .
It can be shown that taking the first order conditions for equation (1.1) yields the
conventional microeconomic result where the ratio of the marginal product of labor and capital
equals to the wage to rent ratio as shown in equation (1.2).
FL wV
=
FK
r

(1.2)

The wage to rent ratio shows how valuable is one input relative to another. If military volunteers
are relatively more expensive compared to military capital (weapons), then this army would have
fewer soldiers and more military capital than the army with less expensive volunteers, ceteris
paribus. A country with relatively more abundant capital and relatively scarce labor force would
value labor more and capital less, resulting in a more capital intensive military. Total combat
casualties would then depend on the amount of labor input used in a given combat for a given
level of capital, technology, and some constant exogenous casualty (depreciation) rate. Thus, a
13

more labor intensive military would be expected to suffer more total combat casualties compared
to a less labor intensive military, holding everything else equal. This is how the relative value of
life in military conflicts is determined by military capital intensity, which is determined by the
relative price of labor.

SCENARIO 2: DICTATORSHIP WITH CONSCRIPTION ARMY

Consider the second scenario where the same hypothetical country is still a dictatorship, but with
a conscription army. This dictator chooses the profit maximizing level of fighting effort or output
in a given conflict for a given payoff pDic, enemy resistance effort YE, conscription wage wC, and
capital rent r. All other variables defined as previously.

Max π CDic = p Dic Q(Y , Y E ) − rK − wC L

(2.1)

K ,L

Conscription places an indirect tax on draftees by forcing them to work for a lower wage
than they would have chosen voluntarily. Hence, conscripts will be paid some wage that is less
then the wage paid in a volunteer army in the first scenario by some constant ε > 0, such that

wC = wV − ε . The dictator’s objective, then, is to draft the warfare profit maximizing level of
labor at the conscription wage wC and to buy the optimal level of capital at the competitive
market price r. The first order conditions for this scenario yield the marginal products ratio that
equals to the ratio of factor prices as shown in equation (2.2).
FL wC wV − ε
=
=
FK
r
r

(2.2)

With the conscription wage being lower the volunteer wage, the dictator in this scenario finds it
optimal to hire more military personnel or soldiers than he would in the first scenario with
volunteer based army. The total level of combat casualties would then be higher in the second
scenario than in the first. Therefore, the total level of casualties under a conscription army is
expected to be higher than under a volunteer army, ceteris paribus. Thus, the wage to rental ratio
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in equation (2.2) tells us that dictatorship with volunteer army would value life more and suffer
fewer casualties in a given conflict than its “twin” regime with conscription army.

SCENARIO 3: DEMOCRACY WITH VOLUNTEER ARMY

Consider the third case scenario where the same hypothetical country has a democracy with a
volunteer army. The democratically elected leader chooses the profit maximizing level of
warfare output in a given conflict for a given payoff pDem, enemy resistance YE, volunteer wage

wV, and capital rent r. The profit function in this representative democracy, however, is a little
different from the two dictatorship scenarios analyzed earlier. Unlike dictatorship, democracy is
governed by the agent that is elected to represent the preferences of his or her constituents.
Therefore, this agent has to maximize warfare profit on the behalf of the median voter and
his/her perceived share of conflict payoff pDem and external conflict cost C.
The interesting thing about conflict payoff pDem under democracy is that the larger the
country the smaller is the share of payoff pDem that the median voter gets from a conflict.
Arguably, the same concept could also apply to the external conflict cost C perceived by the
median voter. If conflict payoff pDem is really small under democracies, then democracies would
find it profitable to fight only the wars with much higher total payoffs compared to dictatorships.
In other words, democracies should be more picky about who they fight, which agrees with
Filson and Werner (2004). However, if C is also very small, then warfare incentives for a
democracy could be similar to those for a dictatorship.
Another interesting point can be made by assuming that the payoff from a given conflict
is like a public good, meaning that the share of payoff pDem that the median voter gets from a
conflict is one and the same as the total conflict payoff. This could explain why democracies are
more likely to go to war with non-democracies if fighting non-democracies results in the payoff
with public good characteristics like giving freedom to the oppressed people, for example.
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It is also reasonable to assume that civilian citizens care about how many of their
countrymen fight and get killed or wounded in a given conflict. They might also care about their
country’s image, which could depend on how successfully the warfare is being conducted or
what combat strategies are being used (Consider civilian or carpet bombing used in Vietnam, for
example). Thus, in general, external conflict cost C could take the form of financial as well as
emotional costs associated with losing one’s family or friends, tarnished national image, etc. The
external conflict cost C is modeled as a linear function of combat casualties, which depend on
the amount of military personnel used in warfare and the degree of battlefield success reflected
in the CSF. In other words, the external cost function is linked to casualties that are, in turn,
linked to the relative war success and size of combat troops. Higher casualties mean higher
external cost of conflict.
The objective function for this democracy with volunteer army is to maximize warfare
profit with respect to labor and capital as shown in equation (3.1).

Max π VDem = p Dem Q(Y , Y E ) − rK − wV L − C ( L, Q(Y , Y E ))
K ,L

(3.1)

All variables are defined as previously. The first order conditions for this democracy with a
volunteer army yield the marginal products ratio in equation (3.2) that shows what costs are
considered in choosing the profit maximizing combinations of labor and capital.
FL wV + C L
=
r
FK

(3.2)

In this scenario, the marginal products ratio in equation (3.2) equals the volunteer wage rate wV
plus the marginal external conflict cost CL divided by the rental rate r. 3 Comparing this scenario
to the previous two scenarios with dictatorship reveals that democracy with a volunteer army
places the highest relative value on labor because it internalizes the marginal external conflict
cost CL perceived by the median voter. By internalizing both private and external costs of
3

Assume that C is well behaved and CL > 0, CLL ≤ 0.
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warfare, democracy with volunteer army faces a higher cost of military personnel relative to
military capital. Thus, it is economically optimal for democracies to go to wars with more capital
intensive forces compared to dictatorships, ceteris paribus. This implies that democracy is
expected to value life more and suffer fewer combat casualties as a result.

SCENARIO 4: DEMOCRACY WITH CONSCRIPTION ARMY

Now, consider the last scenario where the same hypothetical country is still a democracy, but
with a conscription army. A democratically elected leader in representative democracy has to
abide by the payoff pDem and the external conflict cost C as perceived by the median voter.
Having a conscription army, on the other hand, places an indirect tax burden on the draftees in
terms of below the market (if any) wages. Israel is a good example of this case. Israel, while a
democracy, relies heavily on conscription.
The democracy with a conscription army chooses war profit maximizing levels of labor
and capital. All variables are defined as previously.

Max π VDem = p Dem Q(Y , Y E ) − rK − w C L − C ( L, Q (Y , Y E ))
K ,L

(4.1)

The first order conditions yield the following marginal products ratio.
FL wC + C L wV − ε + C L
=
=
FK
r
r

(4.2)

Equation (4.2) shows that democracy with a conscription army faces a lower military personnel
cost resulting in less capital intensive military compared to its democratic counterpart with
volunteer army. Hence, as has been shown previously, conscription would reduce the value of
life in military conflicts and increase total combat casualties.
Table 2.1 summarizes the results from the four scenarios by comparing the factor
payments ratios from the first order conditions of profit maximization. The factor payments
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ratios listed in Table 2.1 show elegantly how different political regimes and military recruitment
institutions considered in this paper affect the relative value of life in military conflicts.
Table 2.1
Marginal Products Ratios from Four Scenarios
Volunteer Army

Conscription Army

Democracy

wV + C L
r

wV − ε + C L
r

Dictatorship

wV
r

wV − ε
r

It is clear from Table 2.1 that democracy with a volunteer army places the highest relative
value on its military personnel (and on their lives consequently) compared to any other scenario
in the paper. This result occurs because of the belief that representative democracy reflects the
preferences of its constituents, thereby internalizing the external costs of war being reflected in
the preferences of the median voter. In addition to that, Table 2.1 shows that a volunteer army
increases the relative value of military personnel because volunteers earn a competitively
determined wage rate that accounts for the private costs of war much better than the lower
conscription wage rate. The interesting case to consider, however, is whether democracy with
conscription army values life more than dictatorship with volunteer army. Depending on the
values of ε and CL, either democracy with conscription army or dictatorship with volunteer army
may claim the second highest value of life among the four scenarios considered in this paper.
Without knowing the values of ε and CL, the difference between these two regimes is
theoretically ambiguous and should be resolved only empirically. Finally, dictatorship with
conscription army places the lowest value on life because this dictatorship does not account
completely for either the private or external cost of a conflict in choosing the profit maximizing
combination of inputs.
18

While the derived marginal products ratios offer elegant analytical conclusions about the
role of political regimes and military manpower systems in the valuation of military personnel
and resulting combat casualties, the real world is too complex to be fully captured by this model.
Nevertheless, this model should be able to capture the main determinants of combat casualties.
This claim would have to be examined empirically.

2.5 Empirical Analysis and Results
As summarized in Table 2.1, democracies with volunteer armies face a higher value (cost) of
military personnel, which forces them to create a more capital intensive military force compared
to dictatorships with conscription armies. A more capital intensive military force is likely to
suffer fewer battlefield casualties compared to a less capital intensive military force, everything
else being equal. The proposition that democratic regimes and volunteer armies lead to lower
combat casualties can be turned into empirically testable hypotheses:

Ho 1. More democratic nations experience lower battlefield deaths.
Ho 2. Heavier conscription reliance leads to higher battlefield deaths.
Testing the above hypotheses by simply regressing battlefield casualties on democracy,
conscription, and some control variables may prove to be a very ad-hoc and unsound approach.
The theoretical model in this paper says that democracy and conscription affect battlefield
casualties indirectly via military capital intensity. Moreover, a single-stage regression without
addressing the endogenous nature of some explanatory variables can significantly bias the
estimates. A two stage least squares with instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) estimation technique
would be preferred, a priori.
There are two data samples used in this paper. The first sample (called pooled) is based
on the data for specific conflicts and their country participants. This sample amounts to, at most,
311 observations and features interstate, civil, and extra systemic conflicts. There could be
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several observations in this sample for the same conflict but different country participants. In the
case of civil wars, there is only one observation entry for each country experiencing a civil war.
The second sample is based on cross-country averages (84 countries) and their battlefield deaths
in the conflicts during the 1950-2002 period. The cross-country regressions should capture the
long-run determinants of combat casualties, while the pooled sample regressions should capture
the short-run determinants and idiosyncrasies of battlefield casualties. Table A.9 lists the
conflicts featured in the pooled sample, while Table A.10 lists countries featured in the crosscountry sample. An unfortunate constraint for these samples, however, is the limited availability
of conscription and economic freedom data. Introducing conscription and economic freedom 4
variables into regression reduces the sample size to 169 and 75 observations, respectively, for the
two samples.
The following structural form system of equations will be estimated using 2SLS-IV
estimator in accordance with the theoretical model where political regimes and military
manpower systems affect military’s capital-labor ratio, which affects the total size of combat
casualties. In other words, military capital intensity (proxied by military expenditures divided by
military personnel) should be endogenous in democracy, conscription, and country’s relative
capital abundance (proxied by real GDP per capita) that are used as instruments in the first-stage
regression shown in equation (5.1).

ME / PERSONNELit = β 0 + β 1 DEMOCRACYit + β 2 CONSC it + β 3 FREEDOM it
+ β 4 (GDP / CAPITAit ) + ε it
(5.1)

4

There are additional limitations with FREEDOM and CONSC variables. Because conscription and economic
freedom indexes come mostly in 5-year intervals it is difficult to match them precisely to some conflicts. See the
appendix for more information on this issue.
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In turn, military capital intensity together with conflict duration, conflict type, and national
capability to conduct warfare can affect the total number of battlefield deaths that would have to
be estimated in the second-stage regression as shown in equation (5.2).

DEATHS ij = β 0 + β 2 ( ME / PERSONNELit )ˆ + β 2 DURATION ij + β 3 CAPABILITYit
+ β 4 CIVILij + β 5UPOPit + ε it

(5.2)

Where ME/PERSONNEL is military expenditures per military personnel in country i in the first
year t 5 of conflict j, DEMOCRACY is a nation’s democracy score in the first year of conflict,
CONSC is the index of conscription reliance, FREEDOM 6 is the index of economic freedom,
GDP/CAPITA is real GDP per capita in the first year of conflict, DEATHS is the total number of
battlefield deaths incurred by country i during conflict j, DURATION measures conflict duration
in calendar years, CAPABILITY is the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) in the
first year of conflict, CIVIL is the dummy variable specifying conflict type (civil war), and
UPOP is the size of urban population in the first year of conflict. Data on battlefield deaths,
conflict type, and conflict intensity come from Gleditsch et al. (2002) made available by Uppsala
University and the Peace Research Institute at Oslo (PRIO). Please look in the appendix for a
more detailed description of variables and data sources.
There are four variables of primary interest in this paper’s regression analysis:
democracy, conscription, economic freedom, and military capital intensity. The first-stage
regression estimates would show if democracy, conscription, and economic freedom variables
are significant determinants of military capital intensity. The economic freedom variable is
included here to control for the potentially important influence of free markets on battlefield
deaths since Gartzke (2005) found it to be an important determinant of peace. A free market
would allow an unconstrained flow of resources (labor and capital) to their most highly valued
5

To avoid capturing the influence of warfare on some independent variables, I only use the first year of conflict
values of these variables.
6
Conscription is one of the components in the economic freedom index. Thus, the FREEDOM variable that is used
in this paper is the economic freedom index net of conscription (courtesy of Robert Lawson).
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usage. Thus, one would expect that the risk premium on serving in the army would be fully
realized in the free market economy making labor relatively more expensive than capital. The
estimate for military capital intensity in the second-stage regression would, in turn, show how
capital to labor ratio affects battlefield deaths. Other independent variables function as control or
instrumental variables for ME/PERSONNEL in equation (5.1). The conflict duration variable
controls for the size of casualties. Variables like national military capability (CINC) and urban
population may capture nation’s natural resource, technological, and human capital capabilities,
while real GDP per capita captures country’s capital abundance per worker.
I first run single-stage regressions as a robustness check and test for model’s
specification. The first regression shown in Table A.4 is applied to the individual conflict
(pooled) sample and performs a version of the so called robust regression that weighs
observations to reduce the outlier bias in coefficient and error estimates. The list of explanatory
variables in this robust single-stage regression consists of democracy, economic freedom,
conscription, real GDP per capita 7 , national military capability (CINC), civil war dummy, and
military capital intensity (i.e. military expenditure per military personnel). The dependent
variable is average annual battlefield deaths calculated as the best available estimate of a nation’s
battlefield deaths in a given conflict divided by its duration (in years). The regression estimates
for the pooled sample show that democracy, economic freedom, and real GDP per capita are
negatively related to battlefield deaths, while conscription, capability, civil war, and military
capital intensity are positively related to battlefield deaths. However, only economic freedom,
real GDP per capita, conscription, capability, and civil war are statistically significant at the 5%
level.
[Table A.4 about here]
7

Regression diagnostics show a high level of correlation (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix) between
democracy, economic freedom, and real GDP per capita. Therefore, a residual obtained from regressing real
GDP/capita on democracy and economic freedom is used in all regressions instead of the original real GDP/capita
variable.
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Since battlefield deaths vary widely across conflicts and country participants, we may
expect more reliable and insightful estimates based on cross-country long term averages. The
next robust regression (Table A.4) fits the same model and yields, at times, very different
estimates compared to the pooled regression. Democracy, conscription, real GDP per capita, civil
war, and military capital intensity are now negatively related to battlefield deaths, while
economic freedom and capability are positively related to battlefield deaths. Only democracy,
capability, and civil war are statistically significant at the 5% level. Clearly, the estimates are not
very consistent across the two different samples. The specification (link) and omitted variable
bias tests shown in Table A.5 indicate that the single-stage regression for the pooled sample is
miss-specified, but the cross-country based regression is not.
[Table A.5 about here]
More importantly, the exogenous specification of military capital intensity is rejected by
the Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests shown in Table A.6. These tests
suggest that the 2SLS-IV estimator is more appropriate in this case.
[Table A.6 about here]
There are five 2SLS-IV regressions based on the pooled sample shown in Table A.7. All
of them use battlefield deaths as the dependent variable, which is sometimes normalized
(divided) by military personnel or years of conflict to check for robustness of regression results.
The first-stage estimates in regression (1) in Table A.7 show that democracy and real GDP per
capita are positively and significantly related to military capital intensity. This regression utilizes
the entire sample size of 311 observations. Including economic freedom and conscription
variables, however, reduces the sample size to 169 observations and makes the democracy
coefficient negative but not statistical significant. Economic freedom and real GDP per capita
turn out to be positively and significantly related to military capital intensity in regression (2),
while conscription appears significantly but negatively related to military capital intensity. The
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other independent variables like capability, conflict duration, and urban population are also
statistically significant in the first stages of regressions (1) and (2). Capability index (CINC) is
negatively related to military capital intensity, perhaps, suggesting that countries with a strong
national military capability do not have to rely as much on capital intensive militaries for defense
as less resource abundant nations do. Urban population is positively related to military capital
intensity, perhaps capturing a higher human capital and economic development effect. In turn,
the negative effect of duration on military capital intensity could capture the resource (capital)
depleting effect of warfare.
[Table A.7 about here]
The second-stage regression estimates in regressions (1) and (2) shown in Table A.7
indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between total battlefield deaths and
(predicted) military capital intensity. This relationship captures the main point of my argument
that political and military manpower institutions affect conflict casualties through military capital
intensity. Conflict duration is significantly and positively (naturally) related to battlefield deaths,
while urban population is weakly significant and negatively related to battlefield deaths.
Looking at 2SLS-IV regression (1) and (2) estimates in Table A.7, it may seem that
democracy loses its significance after controlling for economic freedom and conscription.
However, I argue that this would be a hasty conclusion that neglects the potential presence of
outliers, sample bias, and non-normality of errors. To address these problems, I use robust and
median 2SLS-IV regressions. The median regression decreases the potential outlier effect that
could bias the estimates, while the weighted robust regression adjusts for the frequency of same
country observations appearing in the data sample. 8 As seen in Table A.7, the 2SLS-IV models

8

These robust regressions take the inverse of the probability that the observation is included in the dataset. The
sample weighted robust regressions produce similar estimates as the reported simple robust regressions. Robust
regressions also allow for the non-normality of errors and produce heteroskedasticity and outlier resistant coefficient
estimates and standard errors.
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estimated using robust and median estimators yield significant and consistently signed estimates
for democracy, economic freedom, conscription, and real GDP per capita.
Similarly to the first two regressions in Table A.7, the second-stage estimates from robust
and median regressions support the main claim that military capital intensity is negatively related
to battlefield deaths. The second-stage estimates for military capital intensity in regression (2)
show that a one time raise in the average expenditure per military personnel by $1,000 would
save about 70 lives on average in a given conflict. For a numerically large army, this would be a
prohibitively expensive life-saving policy. The other variables like capability, conflict duration,
and civil war dummy appear statistically significant in both robust and median regressions.
Conflict duration coefficient is negative in the robust regression (3) and positive in the median
regression (4). Capability index (CINC), on the other hand is positively related to battlefield
deaths, which might seem counterintuitive at first. However, I interpret the positive sign as an
indication that countries with larger natural capabilities are perhaps capable of fighting more
intensive and prolonged wars. Conversely, this positive relationship could capture the reverse
causality effect in which warfare needs raise military expenditure and consumption of some
natural resources that make up this capability index (CINC). The end result is higher battlefield
deaths.
Another way to check for the robustness of my findings is to normalize the dependent
variable. This procedure might be better suited for capturing the determinants of relative
battlefield deaths rather than the total conflict size as proxied by total battlefield deaths. To
normalize the dependent variable, I divide it by total military personnel, total population, total
urban population, or years of conflict duration. Table A.7 reports only the estimates for the
regressions with the dependent variable divided by total military personnel. The normalized
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median regression results confirm the previous findings. 9 The first-stage estimates from the
normalized median regression (5) are the same as those in the median regression (4). The
second-stage regression results are a little different, however. In regression (5), urban population
and conflict duration are highly significant, while capability is not. Most importantly, military
capital intensity remains highly significant. The interesting point of these estimates is that
democracy and conscription remain significant even after controlling for economic freedom and
per capita GDP. This evidence supports the view that political institutions matter even after
controlling for economic factors. However, similar to Gartzke (2005), I find that economic
freedom has a much stronger effect (as much as 13 times) than democracy on military capital
intensity.
Another way to check for the robustness of my findings is to run the same regressions on
the cross-country averages of battlefield deaths. These regressions should pick up the long-run
determinants of the average conflict casualties. I first run the 2SLS-IV regression without the
economic freedom and conscription variables. Then, I include these two variables in the
conventional 2SLS-IV regressions estimated using robust and median techniques. The regression
results reported in Table A.8 are similar to those reported in Table A.7. Namely, all regressions
in Table A.8 consistently show that democracy, economic freedom, and real GDP per capita are
positively and significantly related to military capital intensity, which in return is negatively and
significantly related to battlefield casualties. As expected, conscription is negatively and
significantly related to military capital intensity in all regressions. Conversely, conflict duration
and capability turn out statistically significant more consistently compared to the short-run
estimates in Table A.7. Otherwise, the long-run findings with respect to the main four variables
appear to be very robust across different estimation techniques and dependent variables (i.e.

9

Robust and median regressions with the dependent variable normalized by total population, urban population, and
conflict duration produce similar results.
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normalized or not). The tests for the validity of instruments (see Hansen J statistic in Table A.7
and A.8) used in 2SLS-IV regressions show that democracy, economic freedom, conscription,
and real GDP per capita cannot be rejected as instruments. This evidence provides strong support
for the proposed hypotheses.
[Table A.8 about here]
One of the most interesting or intriguing findings is the apparent convergence in the
magnitudes of the coefficients for democracy (increase) and economic freedom (decrease) in the
long-run. For example, the coefficient for economic freedom could be 13 times as large as the
coefficient for democracy in raising military capital intensity in the short-run. In the long-run
however, the difference between these coefficients decreases dramatically. While economic
freedom remains more potent than democracy in raising military capital intensity even in the
long-run, the estimates suggest that political and economic freedoms must converge over time in
their effects on military capital intensity. Also, the coefficients for the military capital intensity in
regression (7) indicate that a one time raise of $1,000 in the average expenditure per military
personnel could save about 130 lives annually in an average conflict. These are much higher
coefficients compared to the short-run coefficient estimates shown in Table A.7.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

Using warfare profit maximization as a theoretical framework, I show how different political
regimes (democracy vs. dictatorship) and military manpower systems (volunteer vs.
conscription) could affect military capital intensity, value of life, and subsequent combat
casualties. The model shows that democracy with volunteer army values life the highest, while
dictatorship with conscription army values life the lowest. The theoretically ambiguous result
occurs when comparing the value of life under democracy with conscription army to that under
dictatorship with volunteer army. Which political regime values life more in these two cases
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depends on how low the conscription wage compared to the external cost of conflict perceived
by the median voter.
The empirical estimates obtained in this paper provide strong support for the model’s
predictions that more democratic regimes and more reliance on volunteer armies (or economic
freedom in general) lead to higher capital intensity of military forces and lower combat
casualties. These findings provide further support for the notion that democratic and free market
nations try to avoid large (costly) military conflicts and suffer fewer combat casualties than less
democratic and market friendly nations. It is also worth noting that economic freedom appears to
be a more robust and potent (as much as 13 times more potent) determinant of military capital
intensity and battlefield deaths than democracy. One of the interesting findings in this paper is
that the effects of democracy and economic freedom on military capital intensity are closer
together in the average cross-country regressions than in the individual (pooled) conflict
regressions. This suggests some convergence in the effect of economic and political freedoms on
military capital intensity in the long-run.
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Chapter 3
Military Expenditure, Arms Trade, and Economic Growth

3.1 Introduction

Some people associate military expenditure with a guarantee of peace and security, yet others see
it as a wasteful enterprise potentially resulting in arms races or direct military confrontation.
Regardless of one’s perspective, arms trade and production is a big business with nontrivial
economic consequences. According to the latest SIPRI estimates, world military expenditure
amounted to $975 billion in 2004 (constant prices), or $162 of military spending per capita and
2.6 percent of world GDP. The United States, for example, is the major determinant of the world
trend in military expenditure with its 47 percent share. Some of the biggest military spenders in
the word are also some of the biggest arms traders. Russia, for instance, established itself as the
main supplier of conventional weapons during 2000–2004 replacing the United States, the
largest supplier for many years. France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the USA were
responsible for 81 percent of all arms deliveries during 2000–2004. The SIPRI estimates also
show that the combined arms deliveries of all 25 EU states to non-EU states made up about 19
percent of all arms deliveries in 2000–2004, making the EU the third largest arms exporter. The
world arms trade rose to $51.6 billion in 1999 with developing countries now capturing the
bigger share of arms trade, thereby reversing the previous trend. Developed nations accounted
for 96 percent of total arms exports in 1999 compared to 92 percent a decade earlier.
These figures highlight the economic significance of the military sector and raise
questions about the likely economic impacts of military expenditure and arms trade. One of the
most relevant and researched issues is the relationship between economic growth and military
expenditure. However, the empirical estimates of this relationship are contradictory or
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inconclusive. Some of this confusion might be due to the non-linear relationship between growth
and military expenditure or incorrectly specified models. Dunne et al. (2005) point out that the
identification (i.e. reverse causality) issues in the defense-growth nexus and the sensitivity of
small deviations in military expenditures to estimation techniques plague the estimates in many
empirical studies. Aizenman and Glick (2003) argue that linear empirical models lead to
inconsistent results when the relationship between economic growth and defense spending is
non-linear, which is what they find to be the case. Taking these arguments into consideration, I
examine the growth effects of military expenditure, arms trade, and their interactions using a
balanced panel data for 28 countries from 1965 to 2000. Using fixed effects, random effects, and
Arellano-Bond GMM estimators, I investigate the non-linear effect of military spending on
economic growth in the Solow and Barro style regressions. Controlling for panel-level
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems that typically plague panel data estimation, I
find that the augmented Solow growth model described by Dunne et al. (2005) performs more
robustly across different estimators than the reformulated Barro growth model. The estimates
indicate a significant non-linear relationship between growth and military spending, being
conditional on net arms exports.

3.2 Literature Review

This section provides a brief review of the commonly referred channels through which military
spending and arms trade may influence economic growth. Whereas Smith (2000) and Dunne
(1996) offer a more detailed description of the various channels of influence from military
spending, I shall provide only a brief summary of these channels. The defense-growth literature
has accumulated a large number of papers analyzing a wide variety of different channels through
which military expenditure may influence growth. These channels can be broadly grouped into
three major categories as done by Dunne et al. (2005): demand, supply, and security channels.
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In the demand channel, military spending works through the Keynesian multiplier effect
that depends on the level and composition of military expenditure. According to this channel,
additional military spending increases aggregate demand in the presence of spare capacity, which
reduces unemployment and increases capital utilization. Hence, military spending is often seen
as having a growth enhancing effect in this specification. In many developing countries, military
spending might be seen as being capable of enhancing social infrastructure (roads,
communication networks, etc.) and human capital (military education and training) that are likely
to contribute to future economic growth. However, military spending has an opportunity cost and
may crowd out investment in human and physical capital. The extent and form of this crowdingout, as pointed out by Dunne et al. (2005), depends on prior utilization of resources and how the
increase in military spending is financed. A constrained government budget requires that an
increase in military expenditure must be financed by budget cuts in other government programs,
higher taxes, higher debt, greater money supply, or some combination of these methods.
Different ways of financing an additional military expenditure might, obviously, have different
effects on output and growth. Moreover, a change in military expenditure may change the
composition of industrial output through input–output effects, according to Dunne et al. (2005).
Clearly, it may not be possible to deduce whether the net effect of higher military spending on
output and growth is positive or negative in this demand channel specification.
In the supply channel, the military sector competes with the civilian sector for labor,
physical capital, human capital, natural resources and, perhaps, technology. The resources used
by the military are not available for civilian use; hence, the opportunity cost of military spending.
Mylonidis (2006) lists a number of opportunity costs associated with a higher military burden
that include: crowded-out public and private investment, adverse balance of payments in arms
importing countries, inefficient bureaucracies (i.e. extensive rent seeking), fewer civilian public
sector services, depleted R&D activities, and skilled workforce in the civilian sector. On the
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other hand, it can be argued that military R&D spending can result in the development of new
technology (i.e. radar, jet engine, nuclear energy) that can spill over into the civilian (private)
sector. Dunne et al. (2005) point out that training in the armed forces can make workers more or
less productive when they return to civilian employment, while military R&D may lead to
commercial spin-offs. Some proponents of military spending argue that some research projects
will not be carried out in the private sector due to the high-risk environment and public-good
characteristics of the final product. If this is true, then military R&D can be a net producer of
positive technological externalities. To complicate things further, consider the argument by
Stroup and Heckelman (2001) that the net effect of military spending on growth is described by a
non-linear, concave function if the military sector exhibits diminishing marginal productivity.
This argument implies that at low levels of military spending the net effect on growth is positive,
but after a certain maximum point, growth declines as military spending continues to expand and
may even become negative. Moreover, Dunne et al. (2005) state that conscription and ideological
fervor may increase the mobilization of factors of production, particularly during times of a
perceived threat of war, potentially leading to greater output if these mobilized resources are not
used exclusively for military purposes. In other words, mobilization efforts could have, at best, a
positive effect on growth in the short run.
In the case of the security channel, the provision of national defense fosters the security
of persons and property rights from domestic or foreign threats, which is essential to the
operation of markets and to the incentives to invest and innovate. This is a very old argument
dating back to Adam Smith, who noted that the first two duties of the state were to protect its
citizens from foreign and domestic oppression or violence. It has been often noted in the
literature that wars and a lack of security are major obstacles to development in many poor
countries. Defense expenditures, thus, can strengthen the incentives to accumulate capital and
produce more output, leading to higher economic growth (Thompson, 1974). However, when
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military expenditures are not driven by basic security needs and are due to the rent-seeking
activities, military expenditures may provoke arms races or damaging wars. Supportive of this
argument is Aizenman and Glick’s (2003) finding, indicating that economic growth increases
with higher military spending when a country faces higher military threats, and that economic
growth decreases with higher military spending when a country experiences high levels of
corruption. In this case, less military spending would be desirable and could lead to positive
security effects on economic growth. For instance, the disarmament process and dramatic cuts in
defense budgets in many countries following the end of the Cold War have often been credited
with generating the so called “peace dividend” that resulted in better standards of living.
Likewise, arms trade may affect economic growth through a number of different
channels, and in a non-linear way, through an interaction with military expenditure similar to the
interaction between military spending and threats examined by Aizenman and Glick (2003). It
might be more insightful to examine arms exports and arms imports separately in order to
identify more accurately the channels through which they may impact growth. In the case of
arms imports, a component of military spending has to be allocated to pay for these purchases.
Arms purchases are not cheap, and some countries have to resort to external borrowing in order
to pay for their arms imports or some portion of their military budget in general. Of course,
foreign borrowing does not necessarily lead to slower economic growth. In fact, reasonable
levels of foreign borrowing might even stimulate growth. Dunne et al. (2003) suggest that, in
evaluating the impact of debt on growth, it is important to consider how the external debt is
being used. If it is used to increase productive capacity, external borrowing may even facilitate
development. However, if the scarce foreign exchange resources are spent on arms imports
instead of investment goods that are essential for self-sustaining growth, then the effect of
external borrowing on growth is likely to be negative. Looney (1989) investigates how military
expenditures and arms imports affect debt in resource-constrained countries and unconstrained
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countries and finds arms imports to be a significant contributor to Third World indebtedness. In
another empirical study, Looney and Frederiksen (1986) find that the unconstrained developing
countries are able to support higher level of arms imports. Gunluk-Senesen and Sezgin (2002)
find that the growth in arms imports has a significant positive effect on external debt, while no
such effect is found for the growth in military spending.
On the other hand, it could be argued that arms imports may help the importing countries
to acquire new technology through reverse engineering or through the necessary training of
military personnel required for operating high-tech weapons systems. In some instances, arms
imports may result in direct technological transfers when they take the form of a licensed
production of military weapons or some of their parts. India and Russia, for instance, signed a
major defense deal for the purchase of 310 new Russian T-90 main battle tanks and their
production under a Russian license in India. This agreement allows India to manufacture some
critical components of the T-90 tanks. Between 1993 and 2005, China acquired the rights to
produce 200 SU-27 and 250 SU-30 fighters domestically under a Russian license. This tendency
toward more licensed production, rather than finished arms imports, is becoming more and more
prevalent in international arms trade, which has become increasingly competitive in the last
decade or so. In light of this tendency, it would be worthwhile to hypothesize about the reasons
that governments have for preferring domestic production of arms instead of arms imports. At
least three arguments come to mind. First, some countries may find themselves at risk when their
defense capabilities depend on the supply of arms from other countries, especially from potential
enemies. Second, some governments may believe that relying on arms imports instead of
producing arms domestically is economically wasteful. Finally, arms imports might be very
difficult to justify politically in election campaigns. Thus, arms exports could be considered
beneficial, and arms imports detrimental, to the economy. Hence, the purpose of this study: to
find out if there is a systematic relationship between arms trade and economic growth for a given
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level of military expenditure. In other words, would the evidence support the argument that arms
imports are necessarily detrimental to growth, and that arms exports, by reverse logic, are
necessarily beneficial for growth?
While this question will be rigorously explored in the empirical section of this paper,
some obvious correlations are already clear. Between 2000 and 2004, according to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the top ten suppliers of arms in the
world were Russia, USA, France, Germany, UK, Ukraine, Canada, China, Sweden, and Israel
(descending order). Also, the SIPRI records show that the world’s top military spenders in total
dollar value in 2004 were USA, UK, France, Japan, China, Germany, Italy, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, and South Korea. Clearly, the majority of these countries are not only some of the
biggest military spenders but also some of the biggest arms exporters. Moreover, the majority of
these countries, with the exception of current and former planned economies, are developed
countries. According to the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report,
developed countries were overall net arms exporters in every year between 1989 and 1999 (see
Figure A.1), as well as in the decade before that, which implies that developing countries were
net arms importers over the same period. These casual observations suggest that arms trade
patterns are correlated with military expenditures and the level of economic development.
Perhaps whether or not a country is a net arms exporter depends on the level of military spending
and technology that, in turn, could be affected by the level of economic development. Relevant
to this idea is the finding by Goldsmith (2003) that economic growth, per capita income, and
democracy are among the significant determinants of military spending. It is possible that arms
exports depend on a country’s technological progress and income. Thus, it is also possible that
arms exports could proxy for spill-over effects or positive technological externalities stemming
from military R&D.
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As is the case with military spending, the net effect of net arms exports is ambiguous in
theory and would ultimately have to be examined empirically. It is difficult to hypothesize about
the direction of the net effect, given that there is a plethora of channels through which military
spending and arms trade could impact economic growth. Since it is impossible to incorporate all
the significant linkages from military spending within one model, researchers often choose to
focus on cross-country growth models. They neglect these complex linkages in favor of a simple
reduced form relationship between output and military spending state Dunne et al. (2005). The
result of this approach is a variety of diverging empirical findings on the defense-growth nexus,
which is not surprising considering the diversity of models, econometric techniques, time
periods, and country samples used. Some of these contradictory findings are due to the severe
econometric and theoretical problems of the Feder-Ram model (Ram, 1995), as Dunne et al.
(2005) argue. Moreover, they conclude that the Feder-Ram model should be abandoned in favor
of the conventional Barro or Solow growth models, which are better suited for analyzing the
defense-growth relationship. Following their advice, I proceed to analyze the relationship
between growth and military spending and arms trade within the context of the two commonly
used Barro and Solow growth models.

3.3 The Augmented Solow Growth Model

In 1956, Robert Solow developed a model that revolutionized the study of economic growth. He
assumed an economy with a standard Cobb-Douglass production function, with decreasing
marginal returns to capital and a fixed level of technology. The textbook Solow growth model
treats the rate of saving, population growth, and technological progress as exogenous. The model
predicts that “poorer” countries should be able to grow at faster rates than “richer” countries,
thereby leading to cross-country convergence, albeit a conditional one, in the standards of living
over time. In their influential paper, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) augmented the textbook
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Solow growth model with human capital. They showed that it could explain as much as eighty
percent of cross-country variation in output per worker, and that it could approximately predict
cross-country convergence in the standards of living. A variant of the augmented Solow growth
model was used by Knight et al. (1996) and Dunne et al. (2004) in estimating the effect of
military expenditure on growth.
The effect of military spending on growth could be modeled in a number of ways. One
way is to assume that military spending (as a share of aggregate output) affects factor
productivity via a level effect on the efficiency parameter that controls labor-augmenting
technical change, as shown by Dunne et al. (2005). To see this, consider the aggregate
neoclassical production function, now featuring the labor-augmenting technological progress
with human capital following Mankiw et al. (1992):

Y (t ) = K (t )α H (t ) β [ A(t ) L(t )]1−α − β ,

(1)

where Y denotes aggregate real income, H is the human capital stock, K is the real capital stock,
L is labor, and A is the technology parameter. Technology parameter A evolves according to:
A(t ) = A0 e gt m(t ) θ ,

(2)

where g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technological progress and m is the share of
military spending in aggregate output. According to this specification by Dunne et al. (2005), a
permanent change in military spending share does not affect the long-run steady-state growth
rate, but it might have a permanent level effect on per-capita income along the steady-state
growth path. Military spending (m) also can affect transitory growth rates along the path to the
new steady-state equilibrium. Provided with this specification, one could estimate the influence
of military spending on growth using panel-level data as was done by Dunne et al. (2004).
Continuing with a concise exposition of this model, one can now observe some of its
dynamic properties. Given the standard assumptions of an exogenous saving rate s, a constant
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labor force growth rate n and capital depreciation d, the model exhibits conventional dynamics of
capital accumulation where human capital per effective worker (he=H/AL) and physical capital
per effective worker (ke=K/AL) evolve the following way:
.

h e (t ) = s h y e (t ) − (n + g + d )he (t )

and

.

k e (t ) = s k y e (t ) − (n + g + d )k e (t ) ,

(3)

where sh and sk denote the shares of human and of physical capital investment in aggregate
income. Human capital is assumed to depreciate at the same rate (d) as physical capital. The
steady-state physical and human capital stock levels are
⎡ s β s 1− β ⎤
k =⎢ h k
⎥
⎣n + g + d ⎦
*
e

1 /(1−α − β )

and

⎡ s 1−α s α ⎤
h =⎢ h k ⎥
⎣n + g + d ⎦
*
e

1 /(1−α − β )

.

(4)

The transitory dynamics of income per effective worker near the steady state are approximated
by

∂ ln y e
= (α + β − 1)(n + g + d )[ln y e (t ) − ln y e* ] .
∂t

(5)

Now, the transitory dynamics of output per effective worker near the steady state need to be
made suitable for empirical analysis. For a more detailed exposition of the model please see
Dunne et al. (2004) and (2005). The equation for income per actual worker is now
⎧
⎫
α
β
α +β
ln y(t ) = e z ln y(t −1) + (1− e z )⎨ln A0 +
ln sk +
ln sh −
ln(n + g + d )⎬
1−α − β
1−α − β
1−α − β
⎩
⎭ (6)
+ θ ln m(t ) − e zθ ln m(t −1) + (t − (t −1)e z ) g

where z≡(α-1)(n+g+d) and θ is the elasticity of steady-state income with respect to the long-run
military expenditure share. While there is a distinction between models of the level of output and
the growth rate, the distinction is less important in practice as shown in Dunne et al. (2005). It is
common in the empirical analysis of economic growth to treat s and n as variant across countries
and time, while g and d as uniform time-invariant constants and A0 as country-specific and timeinvariant (see Knight et al. (1993), Islam (1995), and Dunne et al. (2004)). While s and n are
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often assumed to be constant in cross-sectional long-run growth regressions, it is much easier to
justify this assumption when working with panel data. Using five-year averages instead of annual
values can diminish the effect of business cycles and serial autocorrelation in the empirical
analysis.
The conceptual equation shown above can be adapted for empirical analysis using the
dynamic panel model specification of the following form:

Δ ln yit = β0 + β1 ln yit−1 + β 2 ln sit + β3 ln(nit + g + d ) + β 4 ln hit + β5 ln mit + β6 ln mit−1 + ε it . (7)
This equation will serve as the basis for the forthcoming empirical analysis of economic growth
in the Solow-style regressions. Recalling the earlier discussion of possible linkages between
development (technology) and arms exports, the relationship between growth and arms exports
(ax) or imports (am) can be specified in a manner similar to that of military spending. As with
military spending, arms exports may have a permanent level effect on per-capita income as well
as on transitory growth rates along the steady-state growth path that can be specified for
empirical estimation in the following way:
Δ ln y it = β 0 + β 1 ln y it −1 + β 2 ln s it + β 3 ln(nit + g + d ) + β 4 ln hit
+ β 5 ln mit + β 6 ln mit −1 + β 7 ln axit + β 8 ln axit −1 + ε it

.

(8)

This dynamic panel model specification, but with net arms exports, will serve as the basis for the
forthcoming empirical analysis of military spending and arms trade effects on growth in the
Solow framework. As with many empirical models, the above specification is not without its
problems. Dunne et al. (2005) and Lee et al. (1997) point out that military expenditure and the
error term in this specification influence output in an ad hoc way, which makes it harder to
believe that the share of military expenditure could change technology. The same criticism that
applies to modeling military spending would apply to modeling the effect of arms trade on
economic growth. Whatever the assumed specification of arms trade and military spending might
be, if there exists a significant and robust relationship between growth, military spending, and
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arms trade, a thorough empirical analysis may pick it up regardless of the chosen specification.
Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) test some recent growth models and fail to reject any of them.
However, they also find that an encompassing (combined) model provides a significant
improvement over any of the candidate models they tested. Similarly, I attempt to combine the
specifications of military spending in Aizenman and Glick (2003), Dunne et al. (2004), and
Mylonidis (2006), hoping to find a robust relationship between economic growth, military
spending, and arms trade, regardless of the chosen specification.

3.4 The Barro Growth Model

In their review of theoretical models on military expenditure and growth, Dunne et al. (2005)
conclude that the mainstream models of economic growth like the augmented Solow and the
endogenous Barro growth models should be more suitable for analyzing the defense-growth
nexus than the Feder-Ram model. The Barro (1990) growth model explicitly allows for different
forms of tax financed government expenditures to influence output through the production
function. This model also features the representative agent with explicit utility function that the
government maximizes. Barro’s (1990) model postulates that the government expenditure has a
non-linear effect on growth produced by the interaction between the productivity enhancing and
tax distorting effects of government spending. The theoretical equation describing the
relationship between economic growth and its determinants turns out rather too complex to be
estimated explicitly. This problem is often circumvented in the so-called Barro-style regressions,
in which the theory suggests what variables should enter the unrestricted and ad hoc growth
regression. The same approach is taken by Aizenman and Glick (2003) and Mylonidis (2006),
from whom I borrow my Barro-style specified equation to examine the joint effect of arms trade
and military spending on growth. The Barro-style regression could take on the following form:

growthit = β 0 + β1 yit −1 + β 2 sit + β 3 popg it + β 4 educit + β 5 mit + ε it ,
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(9)

where traditional variables like the log of initial per capita GDP, share of investment in GDP,
population growth, and the log of average years of schooling (human capital) are included in the
regression addition to the share of military spending in GDP. Other control variables could
include institutional, demographic, and geographic characteristics or an interaction term between
military spending and threats or corruption as in Aizenman and Glick (2003). In their paper,
Aizenman and Glick (2003) attempt to clarify a common finding that military spending has an
insignificant or negative impact on economic growth. They conjecture that this finding arises
from non-linear interactions between military expenditure, external threats, and corruption.
Aizenman and Glick (2003) explain the presence of these non-linear interactions in an extended
version of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) by allowing growth to depend on the severity of
external threats and the size of military expenditure associated with these threats. In this novel
specification, national output is influenced by security or military expenditure relative to the
threat. This might be a more plausible specification of the defense-growth nexus for many
countries than the specification in which defense spending influences output through technology.
Aizenman and Glick (2003) hypothesize that military expenditure induced by external threats
should increase output by increasing security, while military expenditure induced by rent seeking
and corruption should reduce growth by displacing productive activities. They suggest a basic
growth equation specification of the following form:

gy = a1mil + a 2 (mil )(thr ) + b1thr + βX + ε ,

(10)

where gy is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, mil is the share of military spending in
output, thr is the level of military threat faced by a country, and X is a set of control variables. In
this specification, the direct effects of military spending and external threats on growth are
assumed negative, while the interactive effect of military spending and threat is positive.
Aizenman and Glick’s (2003) cross-country estimates over the period 1989-98 indicate that
when the threat is low, military expenditure reduces output, especially in countries with a lot of
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corruption. However, when the threat is high, military expenditure increases output. Among the
avenues for further empirical research, Aizenman and Glick (2003) suggest investigating the
relationship between arms trade and corruption as pertaining to growth.
I follow Aizenman and Glick (2003) and analyze the effect of military spending and arms
trade on growth in the Barro-style regression using an interaction term, but with military
spending and net arms exports forming the interaction term instead of military spending and
threats. I also use the same interaction term in the Solow-style regressions.

3.5 Data Description

The two Solow-style and Barro-style regressions used in this paper are based on the same
balanced panel dataset and are very similar in terms of the independent variables included, but
they differ slightly in the specification and format of military spending and some control
variables. Specifically, the Solow-style regression includes lagged net arms exports and natural
log of lagged military spending, whereas the Barro-style regression does not. The other control
variables like investment and population growth enter the Solow-style regression in the natural
log form unlike in the Barro-style regression.
In the Solow-style regression, the dependent variable (growth) is the annual growth rate
of real per capita GDP averaged over five-year intervals. The set of explanatory variables
includes some typical control variables used in the empirical growth literature such as initial real
per capita GDP (yit-1), the average number of years of schooling attained by both sexes 25 years
old and over at all levels of education (hit) taken from the Barro-Lee data set 1 , annual population
growth rate 10 (nit+g+δ) averaged over five-year intervals, and real investment as a share of GDP

1

Education data is taken from Barro and Lee (1994) dataset, which can be found at:
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
10
Given the difficulty of obtaining panel data on working age population, I resort to the common alternative of using
population growth rates instead. Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), I assume g+δ=0.05 to be the same for all
countries and years and add this value to population growth.
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(sit) averaged over five-year intervals. Military expenditure (mit) is measured as a share of GDP
averaged over five-year intervals. A lagged value of military expenditure (mit-1) preceding a fiveyear average is also included in the Solow-style regressions. Net arms exports (naxit) are
measured as (arms exports – arms imports)/(arms exports + arms imports), averaged over fiveyear intervals (all in current dollars). The interaction term (naxit)(lnmit) is the product of net arms
exports and the natural log of military spending. Alternatively, the interaction term is also split
into two different variables that are similar to Aizenman and Glick’s (2003), who create two
interaction terms corresponding to the low and high levels of military threat multiplied by
military spending. In this paper, I split net arms exports into two variables that feature either net
arms exports or net arms imports (or negative net arms exports in absolute value) and zeroes
otherwise. Then, the two new interaction terms are the product of military spending and net arms
exports (naxposit)(lnmit) and the product of military spending and net arms imports
(namposit)(lnmit). The two interaction terms enter the regression together with net arms exports
and net arms imports.
In the Barro-style regressions, the dependent variable (growth) and the explanatory
variables like the initial real per capita GDP, the average number of years of schooling, military
expenditure, and net arms exports are measured the same way, except that they may enter the
Barro-style regression without logs (except for schooling and initial real per capita GDP),
following Mylonidis (2006) and Aizenman and Glick (2003). Investment share, military
expenditure share, and population growth enter Barro-style regressions without logarithms. The
interaction terms in the Barro-style regressions are constructed in the same way as those in the
Solow-style regressions.
Data on GDP, population, and investment are obtained from the Penn World Tables,
version 6.1. Education data for the human capital proxy are taken from the Barro-Lee (1994)
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dataset. Data on military spending 11 come from various SIPRI Yearbooks (Stockholm
International Peach Research Institute), while data on arms exports and imports are taken from
various editions of WMEAT (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers), published by
the U.S. Department of State after integration with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. Please refer to the appendix for more variable descriptions and data sources. The value
of each explanatory variable either represents the calculated average over the seven five-year
periods of the dependent variable (1966 – 1970, 1971 – 1975, 1976 – 1980, 1981 – 1985, 1986 –
1990, 1991 – 1995 and 1996 – 2000) or the lagged value that correspond exactly to the base
years 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 (like yit-1, mit-1, and naxit-1). Data reflecting
the seven five-year periods are analyzed for a sample of 28 countries (Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela). The total number of
observations in this cross-sectional time-series data set is 196 (7 five-year periods for each of the
28 countries).

3.6 Empirical Analysis and Results

The approach taken in this section consists of estimating and comparing the effects of military
spending and arms trade on economic growth in the Solow and Barro style regressions. The
effects of military spending and arms trade on growth will be analyzed separately and together
(via interaction terms) using different estimation techniques for the robustness of results.
While growth models have been most successful in cross-sectional empirical studies,
panel data estimation can provide a number of significant advantages over cross-sectional

11

Military spending and some GDP data missing from the PWT was kindly provided by Dunne, Smith, and
Willenbockel (2004).
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analysis. Given the availability of cross-country time-series data, the fixed effects estimator or
the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model seems like the appropriate choice. When the
unobserved effects are correlated with the observed covariates, the standard estimator used to
eliminate the potential bias caused by omitted heterogeneity is the fixed effects (within)
estimator. The fixed effects estimator is popular because it is simple, easily understood, and
makes robust standard errors readily available, writes Wooldridge (2001). When analyzing the
fixed effects estimator, the standard assumptions are that the time-varying errors have zero
means, constant variances and zero correlations. In the presence of omitted variable bias and
unobserved country and time effects that often appear in country level panel data, the fixed
effects estimator is preferred over the pooled or random effects estimators. Islam (1995) explores
the suitability of LSDV fixed effects estimator for growth estimation with panel data. He argues
that fixed effects estimator is a very suitable technique because of the individual country effects
being correlated with the exogenous variables in the model. After conducting a Monte-Carlo
study, Islam (1995) finds that the LSDV estimator, although being consistent in the direction of
T only, performs very well.
However, there are a number of problems that plague panel data models in general and
the LSDV models in particular. Too many dummy variables, for example, may significantly
deplete the degrees of freedom, while country-specific (groupwise) heteroskedasticity or
autocorrelation over time would violate the normality and homogeneity of errors assumption.
Outliers can bias regression slopes, and heteroskedasticity problems from groupwise differences
can bias standard errors. Panel data may exhibit panel specific or general autocorrelation,
requiring dynamic panel analysis. The fixed effects OLS estimator would suit fine for panel
estimation as long as there are no heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. However,
these conditions are so rare that it is often unrealistic to expect that OLS will suffice for such
models, notes Yaffee (2003). Under these conditions, the more suitable and commonly used
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estimator, according to Yaffee (2003), is the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). Greene
(2002) and Wooldridge (2002) also recommend using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent
covariance estimator with OLS estimation in fixed effects models for it can produce standard
errors robust to unequal variance along the predicted line.
For robust estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and outliers
Yaffee (2003) recommends using a generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation with
robust (White, Newey-West) panel standard errors. Wooldridge (2001) notes that some of the
most interesting recent GMM applications are to panel data. According to Wooldridge (2001), if
either heteroskedasticity or serial correlation is present, a GMM procedure can be more efficient
than the fixed effects estimator, but the potential gains over standard applications are largely
unknown. Generalized method of moments is applied more often to unobserved effects models
when the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous even after controlling for an
unobserved effect. Thus, GMM appears indispensable for more sophisticated applications such
as dynamic unobserved effects panel data models, concludes Wooldridge (2001). Although
GMM estimators can be asymptotically normal, they may not always be the most efficient ones,
argues Yaffee (2003). Another concern associated with using a dynamic GMM estimator is a
loss of valuable observations (information to infer from) in small samples.
Concerned with the typical issues plaguing panel data estimation, I perform the BreuschPagan heteroskedasticity and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests, which confirm the suspected
heteroskedastic and AR (1) error structure. In light of this evidence, it is clear that the FGLS and
Arellano-Bond GMM, with the correctly specified error structure, should be my preferred
estimators. Considering the growing popularity of the fixed effects estimator and the preceding
discussion of recommended panel estimators, I propose using the two-way fixed effects FGLS
estimator with standard errors robust to groupwise heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as a
benchmark with which the GLS random effects and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators are to be
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compared. The estimates from two-way fixed effects FGLS, or analogously FGLS-DV (FGLS
with dummy variables), can be compared to the random effects estimates using the Hausman
specification test. The random effects model is very different from the fixed effects model and
requires that the cross-sectional error must be uncorrelated with explanatory variables. One way
to handle the error term is to assume that the intercept is a random effect (outcome) variable in
the time-series cross-sectional regression model. The Hausman specification test is the
commonly used method of deciding which model, fixed or random effects, is more appropriate
for the chosen empirical analysis. The dynamic panel data estimation method, known as the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, can be very useful in addressing the endogeneity of explanatory
variables in growth regressions, as noted by Dreher (2005) in his application of Arellano-Bond
estimator in globalization and growth study. The GMM estimator is convenient for estimating
interesting extensions of the basic unobserved effects model when unobserved heterogeneity
interacts with observed covariates, according to Wooldridge (2001). The one and two step
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator can be robust to violations of heteroskedasticity, normality, and
autocorrelation in errors. As suggested by Yaffee (2003), the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator
with instrumental and first-differenced lagged variables may circumvent problems with
correlations of errors and help obtain additional efficiency gains over other panel data estimators.
Now, I am ready to present and compare the estimates from Solow and Barro style
regressions. The basic Solow-style fixed effects regression equation can be specified as follows:
growthit = α i + α t + β 1 ln y it −1 + β 2 ln s it + β 3 ln(nit + g + d ) + β 4 ln hit + β 5 ln mit
+ β 6 ln mit −1 + β 7 naxit + β 8 naxit −1 + β 9 (naxit )(ln mit ) + ε it

, (11)

where mit and naxit are the military spending and net arms exports variables and (naxit)(mit) is
their interaction term. The interaction term in this Solow-specified model is an ad hoc empirical
extension done for the purpose of comparing the Solow-style regression results with the Barrostyle regression results. Note that military spending enters regressions in the log form, while the
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net arms exports variable does not, due to its taking on negative values in some observations.
The basic Barro-style fixed effects regression equation is specified as follows:
growthit = α i + α t + β1 ln yit −1 + β 2 sit + β 3 popgit + β 4 ln hit
+ β 5 mit + β 6 naxit + β 7 (naxit )(mit ) + ε it

,

(12)

where military spending, net arms exports, and the interaction term are defined as before.
Beginning with the basic Solow-style regression results reported in Column 1 of Table
A.14, current military spending appears to be negatively and significantly (at 1%) related to
economic growth in the two-way fixed effects FGLS regression with groupwise heteroskedastic
and panel-specific AR (1) adjusted standard errors. Using the same dataset, Dunne et al. (2004)
also find the same negative and significant relationship between current military spending and
economic growth using fixed effects and random coefficient estimators. Lagged military
spending is not statistically significant in this FGLS regression. Traditional growth regressors
such as the lagged per capita GDP, investment share, population growth, and human capital
(schooling) all have the expected signs and appear statistically significant (except for human
capital). Adding net arms exports to a regression does not change the negative sign or
significance level of current military spending, but it makes lagged military spending statistically
significant and positively related to growth. The current and lagged net arms exports are
negatively related to growth, but they are not statistically significant and nor is human capital
(Column 2, Table A.14). The human capital variable in this regression has a wrong sign: it is
negatively related to growth. This anomalous result regarding the role of human capital in
growth regressions is not new, according to Islam (1995). He attributes this illogical finding to
the discrepancy between the theoretical variable H used in the model and the actual variable used
in regressions. Moreover, the true levels of human capital in some countries have not increased
by much. Statistically, this leads to a negative temporal relationship between the human capital
variable used in regressions and economic growth. A richer specification of production function
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with respect to human capital, writes Islam (1995), would allow the theoretical properties of the
human capital variable to be better reflected in the regression results.
The next step is to add an interaction term (military spending times net arms exports) in
order to test for a significant non-linear relationship between current military spending and
economic growth that is contingent upon the level of net arms exports. This is the approach used
by Aizenman and Glick (2003) in their study of the interaction between military spending and
threats resulting in non-linear relationship between military spending and growth. The regression
results listed in Column 3 (Table A.14) show a significant positive relationship between the
interaction term and growth and significant negative relationship between net arms exports and
growth, while maintaining a significant and negative relationship between current military
spending and growth. These estimates suggest that while current military spending and net arms
exports have a negative effect on growth, the effect of military spending on growth becomes
positive with higher net arms exports. This finding is similar to the non-linear relationship
between growth and military spending in the presence of military threats found by Aizenman and
Glick (2003). In this regression, however, population growth and human capital are not
statistically significant. What is surprising, however, is the negative and significant relationship
between growth and net arms exports; I had expected to see a positive relationship between the
two. Perhaps this estimated relationship captures the fact that richer countries tend to be net arms
exporters and that they tend to grow more slowly than poor countries, as predicted by the Solow
growth model.
The next step is to explore the endogenous nature of military spending. As previous
research has shown, some variables in growth regressions may also exhibit endogeneity
problems. Fertility, for example, could be influenced by measures of wealth, according to Barro
and Lee (1994). Similarly, the military spending variable could be subject to the same
endogeneity problem. Using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, I find that military
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spending is indeed significantly endogenous. 12 One way of addressing this endogeneity problem
is to use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. In the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation,
the right-hand side variables can be instrumented with first-differenced lags, as well as other
instruments, and the validity of the exogeneity assumption can be tested. The Arellano-Bond
GMM estimator consists of first-differencing the estimated equation and using lags of the
dependent variable and explanatory variables as instruments. Due to first-differencing, this
estimator also removes the individual country effects and first-order autocorrelation that might
be present in the data.
Often, good instruments (those correlated with the included explanatory variables and
uncorrelated with the error term) are hard to find. Goldsmith (2003) finds several significant
determinants of military spending that could aid in choosing the appropriate instruments.
Goldsmith (2003) identifies the lagged military spending, economic growth, wealth, and political
regime type as significant and robust determinants of military spending. Since economic growth
and lagged wealth (per capita GDP) are already included in the model, I use the natural log of
political regime type, natural log of total country population, and Composite Index of National
Capability (CINC) as instruments. 13 Among these three instruments, the natural log of political
regime type was found to be negatively and significantly related to military spending in a
separate 2SLS-IV regression (results not shown to save space). The same regression also picked
up a significant negative relationship between military spending and net arms exports. The
Hansen J statistic from the same 2SLS-IV regression showed that the instruments chosen to
identify current military spending could not be rejected.

12

One interesting result that comes out of the endogeneity testing is that democracy (used as an instrument for
military spending) appears negative and statistically significant suggesting that the apparent correlation between
democratic regimes and income per capita could be at least partially attributed to lower military burdens.
13
Political regime type is constructed according to this commonly used formula (DEMOC-AUTOC+10)/2. The
democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC) measures come from Polity IV Project.
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To address the endogeneity of military spending with the available instruments, I use the
one-step Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with robust standard errors for coefficient inferences.
However, I use the two-step Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for autocorrelation and validity of
instruments inferences. 14 The results from the one-step Arellano-Bond regression are shown in
Column 4, Table A.14. Like Dreher (2005), I use the natural logarithm of per capita GDP (fiveyear average) as a dependent variable instead of the growth rate because the Arellano-Bond
estimator is formulated in differences, which means that the regression shows how changes in
levels are converted into changes in growth. In this specification, the lagged dependent variable
is no longer capturing growth convergence; instead, it is likely to capture growth momentum. All
explanatory variables come out of the regression expressed in first-differences or lagged firstdifferences. The regression results show that lagged dependent variable, investment share, and
population growth are statistically significant and have the expected signs. Moreover, the human
capital variable has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant. The military
spending variable appears statistically significant and negatively related to growth, while both
net arms exports and the interaction term are negatively related to growth but not statistically
significant. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (i.e. validity of instruments) shown in
Column 4 (Table A.14) implies that the instruments chosen to identify current military spending
could not be rejected. However, different specifications of Arellano-Bond regression produce
different signs and significance levels for the net arms exports variable and the interaction term,
while the estimates for military spending seem robust to different specifications. Only in one
specification, where military spending is treated as an independent variable rather than an
endogenous one, does the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator produce a statistically significant

14

Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the one-step GMM estimator for coefficient inferences because in
small samples like mine standard errors tend to be under-estimated by the two-step estimator. The two-step
estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the one-step estimates. The Arellano-Bond
estimator, however, leads to a loss of observations from 196 to 140 since information from two periods is discarded
by first-differencing.
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and negative coefficient for net arms exports. Although the interaction term has the expected
positive sign in the same specification of the Arellano-Bond regression, it is not statistically
significant. Although this specification of the Arellano-Bond regression supports the findings
from the other specifications, its results are not shown here in order not to give the questionable
exogenous specification of military spending too much credit.
Now, let’s compare the above Solow-style regressions with the forthcoming Barro-style
regressions. Table A.15 lists the results for the Barro-style regressions that mimic the Solowstyle regressions in Table A.14. The lagged per capita GDP, investment share, and population
growth variables (but not human capital) exhibit robust relationship with growth as found in the
Solow-style regressions. Military spending is statistically significant and negatively related to
growth, which is a similar to what was found with FGLS by Mylonidis (2006). However, the
Barro-style regressions do considerably worse than the Solow-style regressions when it comes to
picking up statistical significance for military spending and net arms exports when the
interaction term is included. More specifically, military spending is statistically significant and
negatively related to growth as long as the interaction term does not enter the regression
(Column 3, Table A.15). Net arms exports and the interaction term are not statistically
significant at the 5% level, but they have the expected signs. Similar results are observed in the
Arellano-Bond GMM regression shown in Column 4, Table A.15. Neither military spending nor
net arms exports, nor the interaction term, are significant in this Arellano-Bond GMM
regression. The Sargan and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests fail to reject the validity of
instruments and absence of second-order autocorrelation, respectively. Clearly, the estimates for
military spending and net arms exports do not appear as robust in the Barro-style regressions as
the do in the Solow-style regressions.
The next step is to explore separately the effects of arms exports and imports on growth.
To do so, I split the net arms exports variable into two variables: net arms exports and net arms
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imports (in absolute value). If a country is a net arms exporter, then it has zero for the net arms
imports variable. If a country is a net arms importer, then it has zero for the net arms exports
variable. Splitting the net arms exports variable into two allows me to create two interaction
terms through which net arms imports and net arms exports can separately influence growth. As
before, I begin with the Solow-style regressions listed in Table A.16. In the first such regression
(Column 5, Table A.16), current military spending is significantly and negatively related to
growth, while current net arms exports and net arms imports are positively related to growth, but
only net arms imports are statistically significant. A slightly different story unfolds in the next
regression (Column 6, Table A.16) when the two interaction terms are included. The major
difference between the two regressions is that current net arms exports and its interaction with
military spending appear statistically significant, as shown in Column 6. The net arms exports
variable is negatively related to growth, and its interaction with the military spending variable is
positively related to growth.
The next regression utilizes the GLS random effects estimator with the AR (1)
disturbance term. This estimator examines the impact of military spending, arms trade and their
interactions on growth by producing a matrix-weighted average of the between and within
effects. Surprisingly, the random effects regression performs very well. Variables like per capita
GDP, investment share, population growth, military spending, and even human capital come out
statistically significant and have the expected signs (Column 7, Table A.16). However, this
random effects estimator is rejected by the Hausman specification test in favor of the two-way
fixed effects FGLS estimator.
In the new Arellano-Bond GMM regression (Column8, Table A.16), the lagged per
capita GDP, investment share, population growth, and military spending show significant and
robust relationship with growth in various specifications of this estimator. The same cannot be
said about net arms exports, net arms imports, and their interactions terms. None of these
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variables appear statistically significant at the 5% level in the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM
estimator (see results in Column 8, Table A.16). The other variables in this regression have the
expected signs and appear statistically significant (except for human capital). This ArellanoBond regression also passes the instrumental variable and second-order autocorrelation tests.
Let’s repeat and contrast the same regressions in the Barro-style analysis where the net
arms exports variable is also split up into two. Again, the Barro-style regressions do not produce
as robust results as the comparable Solow-style regressions do. While, lagged per capita GDP,
investment share, population growth, military spending, and net arms imports appear significant
and correctly signed, adding the two interaction terms to this regression eliminates significance
for the military spending variable and net arms imports. However, the net arms exports
interaction term is now highly significant and positively signed (see Column 5 and 6, Table
A.17).
The GLS random effects estimator does relatively well in terms of producing the
expected signs and significance for key control variables in this Barro-style regression (Column
7, Table A.17), but it does worse than the two-way fixed effects FGLS estimator in terms of
picking up significance for the interaction terms. Moreover, the random effects estimator is
rejected by the Hausman specification test in favor of the fixed effects estimator. The ArellanoBond one-step GMM estimator in the Barro-style specification returns only the lagged per capita
GDP and investment share variables as statistically significant (Column 8, Table A.17).
However, this regression passes the instrumental variable and second-order autocorrelation tests.
Now is a good time to summarize the results from the Solow and Barro-style regressions.
There are two main conclusions that I can draw from these results. First, although the Solow
growth model is very tight or restrictive theoretically, its empirical specification adapted from
Dunne et al. (2004) performs much better empirically, compared to the Barro-style empirical
specification adapted from Mylonidis (2006) and Aizenman and Glick (2003). In other words,
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the estimates for military spending are more robust in the Solow-style regressions, compared to
the Barro-style regressions. Furthermore, I provide the results from the link and omitted variable
tests for the two models (Table A.18). These tests indicate that the basic OLS estimated Solow
and Barro style regressions are correctly specified, but the Solow-style regression has more
explanatory power as evidenced by the R-squared. Thus, I recommend using the augmented
Solow growth model approach for studying the defense-growth nexus as described in Dunne et
al. (2004) and Dunne et al. (2005).
The second important conclusion is that the estimates for military spending are much
more robust across different estimators than are those for net arms exports (imports) and the
interaction terms. Since the random effects estimator was rejected in favor of the fixed effects, I
am left to choose between the fixed effects FGLS and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators.
According to Wooldridge (2001), generalized method of moments can improve, in large
samples, over the standard panel data methods like ordinary, two-stage least squares or fixed
effects when auxiliary assumptions fail. However, Wooldridge (2001) also notes that because
these standard panel data methods can be used with robust inference techniques allowing for
heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, the gains to practitioners from using GMM may be small,
especially in small samples. Considering that the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator reduces my
sample from 196 to 140 observations, it is a very valid concern. Moreover, the existing
ambiguity with the correct specification of the endogenous variables and sensitivity of ArellanoBond estimates to different specifications complicate the reliability of inference for this
estimator. Moreover, the fixed effects FGLS takes into account time invariant and individual
country effects, whereas the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator does not. Thus, I am more inclined
to infer about the effects of military spending, arms trade, and their interaction terms on growth
from the two-way fixed effects FGLS or the FGLS-DV estimator. The two-way fixed effects
FGLS based on the Solow growth model suggests that while higher military spending and net
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arms exports lead, on their own, to lower economic growth, higher military spending is less
damaging to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter.

3.7 Concluding Remarks

Using fixed effects, random effects, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators I investigate the effect
of military spending, arms trade, and their interactions on economic growth in the Solow and
Barro style regressions. The estimates suggest that the augmented Solow growth model with
military spending described by Dunne et al. (2005) provides more robust estimates than the
reformulated Barro model used by Aizenman and Glick (2003). According to the Solow-style
regression estimates, military spending is negatively related to economic growth. This is a
finding that is robust to different estimation techniques in the Solow model. However, the
estimates for net arms exports and interaction terms are not as robust across different estimators.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be reached. Higher military spending and net arms exports
separately lead to lower economic growth, but higher military spending is less damaging to
growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. In other words, if a country hopes to gain (or
lose less) in terms of economic growth from additional military spending, it better be a net arms
exporter. As for a future research avenue, it would be interesting to investigate what determines
whether a country is a net arms exporter or importer, and whether policy makers can or should
do anything about it.
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Chapter 4
Ideology, Legislative Shirking, and the Incumbency Advantage:
Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives

4.1 Introduction

In a perfectly competitive legislative market voters would deter shirking politicians by voting
them out of office and reward hard working politicians by reelecting them. In theory, this sorting
or selection mechanism would lead to reelection of highly qualified incumbents and low
incumbent turnover rates. Indeed, the turnover rate for incumbents in the U.S. Congress has been
very low in most years. Apparently, incumbents enjoy a significant advantage over challengers,
which allows incumbents to win, on average, more than 80% of the time in the U.S.
Congressional elections. In primaries, incumbents win even more often. While it may seem that
this evidence supports the outcome expected from a perfectly competitive legislative market, one
could also argue that the same evidence is consistent with the view that incumbents have
significant monopoly power in the electoral market giving them significant advantage over
challengers. This incumbency advantage could stem from gerrymandering, disparities in
campaign resources, and asymmetric information. If this is true, then the selection process cannot
effectively deter politicians from shirking or enacting their own ideological preferences while in
office.
In this paper, I examine the role of the incumbency advantage in allowing incumbents to
legislate their own ideological preferences that are different from their constituents. In other
words, would a rise in the incumbency advantage lead to a rise in legislative shirking? To answer
this question, I augment the political competition model of Chen and Emerson (2003) by
showing that incumbents face a tradeoff between vote maximizing and legislating their own
ideological preferences. In the case of risk-averse voters, the model suggests that incumbents are
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able to propose a platform farther away from the median voter compared to challengers and still
get reelected. I proceed to test the model predictions empirically. In their review of the literature
on voting and legislative shirking, Bender and Lott (1996) acknowledge the lack of empirical
studies addressing legislative shirking on the aggregate level. I attempt to fill this void by testing
the predictions of the model using the aggregate statistics for the U.S. House of Representatives.
I find evidence suggesting that a rise in the incumbency advantage leads to more total legislative
shirking. In light of these findings, the pattern of declining incumbent turnover in the U.S.
Congress suggests that the incumbency advantage has risen and so did legislative shirking
purchased with incumbent vote surplus.

4.2 Theoretical Model

In a perfectly competitive political environment, one may conclude that an incumbent’s defeat in
a primary election is nothing but a punishment for legislative shirking or inadequate
representation of constituents’ interests. The available statistics for the U.S. House and Senate
elections in the post war period show an increasing likelihood of incumbent reelection.
Incumbents appear to enjoy a significant advantage over challengers, which allows them to win
on average 80% of the time in the U.S. Senate, according to Gowrisankaran et al. (2004). The relection rate for incumbents in primary elections is even higher. The idea of efficient market
sorting of shirking politicians may seem, at first, to agree with this evidence. Gowrisankaran et
al. (2004) investigate why incumbent senators win so often. They find that the apparent
incumbency advantage can be explained by selection effects and lower quality of challengers
running against incumbents relative to higher quality of challengers running for open seats.
However, a rising likelihood of incumbent reelection may also agree with the well
documented evidence (Smith, 1999) on decreasing political competition for incumbent seats,
growing incumbency advantage in campaign resources, and declining importance of party
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identification. Given this evidence, a persistent increase in the number of reelected incumbents
may reflect a significant monopolization of the electoral process rather than an efficient sorting
of shirking incumbents. Asymmetric information, information costs, and ideological bias are
among the factors that can limit the degree of competitiveness in the legislative process.
In contrast to the previous research, this paper is less concerned with explaining the
incumbency advantage and more concerned with its implications for legislative shirking. This
paper links incumbency advantage with legislative shirking (and ideology) in the context of the
legislator-voter agency problem. In this paper, I assume that incumbents maximize not only the
probability of winning an election but also the rents they derive from legislative shirking in the
broadest sense, regardless of whether it is pursuing their own legislative ideology or collecting
rents from lobby groups. The idea of incumbents trading some of the incumbency advantage for
their own preferences is not new. For instance, Sobel (1992) points out that the idea of viewing
politicians only as the vote maximizing agents is simply naïve. Hence, Sobel (1992) models
politicians as vote maximizing agents who also pursue their own interests, even sometimes
rationally getting themselves voted out of office. The obvious conclusion of Sobel’s model is
that incumbents should be willing to trade some of the extra votes in exchange for pursuing their
own preferences. This is the same concept that I build on in this paper. I speculate that voter risk
aversion towards uncertainty may allow an incumbent to get reelected even if that incumbent has
deviated from the promised platform (i.e. shirked) on which he or she was voted into office.
In order to build a model of legislative shirking, I borrow the basic model setup from
Chen and Emerson (2003) who address the issues associated with incumbency and term limits. I
augment their model to show that an incumbent can shirk and win in an election in the presence
of risk-averse voters. Like Chen and Emerson (2003), I assume a one-dimensional policy space
[0, 1]. Furthermore, only two candidates (incumbent and challenger) compete for office in this
static model. The incumbent’s actual platform that he chooses to implement while in office is
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denoted by x I and the challenger’s proposed platform is denoted by xC . Let x PI denote the
incumbent’s platform that he promised and was elected upon in the previous election. Assume
that x PI is given exogenously in the current period. Similar to Chen and Emerson, I let x PC to
be the position (platform) of the challenger as perceived by the voters based on the party’s or
challenger’s history. In other words, x PC

means that voters do not accept the challenger’s

platform at the face value. Unlike the challenger, the incumbent runs for reelection on the
platform x I that he chooses to implement while in office. The idea behind this specification is
that the incumbent may have an incentive or ideological preference for implementing platform

x I that is different from the platform x PI promised to the voters in the previous election.
Assume that the incumbent is the left-wing candidate and that the challenger is the rightwing candidate such that
0 ≤ x PI ≤

1
≤ x PC ≤ 1 .
2

Also, assume that voters’ preferences over policies are single-peaked and characterized by the
following quadratic utility function
u x ( y ) = −( y − x ) 2 ,

where x is the voter’s most-preferred policy and y is the actually policy implemented. From
now on, a voter x is identified by his most preferred policy x in one-dimensional policy space. I
assume that x is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Like Chen and Emerson, I argue that a challenger and an incumbent may differ in their
ability to propose platforms in an election. Thus, when a challenger proposes some platform xC ,
the voters form an expectation of that platform due to the uncertainty associated with whether or
not the promised platform will be implemented. Chen and Emerson allow voters to form an
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xC with
expectation of the challenger’s platform that is represented by the random variable ~
xC ) . Then, voter x ’s expected utility associated with platform xC becomes
density function g ( ~
1

u x ( xC ) = − ∫ ( ~
xC − x ) 2 g ( ~
xC )d~
xC = −V ( xC ) − [m( xC ) − x] 2
0

xC with variance V ( xC ) . Chen and Emerson
where m( xC ) is the mean of the random variable ~
xC is exactly the proposed
further assume that m( xC ) = xC , which means that the mean of ~
platform. Then, V ( xC ) is the extent to which the voters perceive the candidate’s real position
with uncertainty. Hence, the challenger’s utility to voters is a function of uncertainty regarding
the candidate’s true position ( V ( xC ) ) and the distance between the voter’s and the candidate’s
expected positions ( xC − x) . The voter’s utility for the challenger decreases in both variables.
Like Chen and Emerson, I further decompose V ( xC ) into v + k ( xC − x PC ) 2 , where v is voter
disutility from intrinsic uncertainty that is associated with the challenger and k ( xC − x PC ) 2 is the
disutility of voters from extrinsic uncertainty caused by the challenger’s strategic positioning.
Interpret v as the voter’s risk premium for being indifferent between accepting a definite

xC with the mean value xC . Meanwhile,
position xC and accepting a random position ~
k ( xC − x PC ) 2 could be interpreted as voter’s skepticism towards the platform proposed by the

challenger. Thus, the more the challenger deviates away from his historical platform or his
party’s platform the greater is the uncertainty with which he will be perceived by the voters. By
introducing voter risk aversion towards uncertainty, this framework constrains the challenger’s
ability to propose any platform by making the voters suspicious (risk averse) about the
challenger and his platform.
In contrast to Chen and Emerson, I apply the same variance concept to the incumbent but
without the intrinsic utility v . This variance, then, represents voter disutility associated with the
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incumbent choosing platform x I that deviates from the promised platform x PI . I interpret the
departure from the promised platform ( ( x PI − x I ) ) as legislative shirking that adversely affects
voter utility. This legislative shirking specification can include the incumbent’s pursuit of his
own ideology, rent-seeking, or whatever else the incumbent does that adversely affects voter
utility. The greater is k ( x I − x PI ) 2 the greater is voter disutility from the incumbent’s shirking. I
assume that incumbent shirks in the direction away from the median voter or ( x PI − x I ) > 0 so
that the incumbent is forced to trade off some of his potential votes for some amount of
legislative shirking. In other words, the incumbent’s platform x I must be always to the left
of x PI if he chooses to shirk. If ( x PI − x I ) < 0 and x PI < 1 / 2 , the problem would be trivial
because vote and shirking maximizing would become identical and maximizing x I would be the
dominant strategy. This would mean that there is no tradeoff between pursuing legislative
shirking and maximizing votes. Now, voter x ’s utility functions associated with each candidate
can be written as:
u x ( xC ) = −v − k C ( xC − x PC ) 2 − ( xC − x ) 2

(1)

u x ( x I ) = − k I ( x PI − x I ) 2 − ( x I − x ) 2

(2)

Define xC as the platform chosen by the challenger. Define v as a fixed level of voter disutility
from intrinsic uncertainty associated with the challenger and k ( xC − x PC ) 2 as the disutility of
voters from extrinsic uncertainty caused by the challenger’s strategic positioning. Also, define

x I as the incumbent’s strategic platform chosen to be implemented during his term in office and

x PI as the platform promised by the incumbent in the previous election. Assume that both x PC
and x PI are given exogenously. Now, define x such that it is the position of the voter who is
indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger, which yields the following expression:
− k I ( x PI − x I ) 2 − ( x I − x ) 2 = −v − k C ( xC − x PC ) 2 − ( xC − x ) 2
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(3)

Solving this expression for x yields:
2

2

2

2

2

x + k I x PI − 2k I x PI x I + k I x I − xC − v − k C xC + 2k C xC x PC − k C x PC
x= I
2( x I − xC )

2

(4)

In accordance with the earlier assumptions, the share of votes obtained by the incumbent is
determined by this CDF:
x

∫ f ( x)dx = F ( x )

(5)

0

The share of votes obtained by the challenger is then:
1

∫ f ( x)dx = 1 − F ( x )

(6)

x

Now, think of the competition between the incumbent and the challenger as a sequential
Stackelberg game. The incumbent chooses his platform x I first. The challenger observes the
incumbent’s choice and chooses his platform xC based on x I . The incumbent, in turn, chooses
the optimal x I taking into account the challenger’s response.
To solve this game, I let the challenger to maximize his vote share 1 − F ( x ) with respect
to xC . Solving the first-order condition for xC yields the following positive root (the negative
root is discarded as meaningless).
2

*

xC =

2

2

2

xI + kC xI + (−(kC +1)(2kC xPC xI − kC xPC − kC xI − v + kI xPI − 2kI xPI xI + kI xI ))
kC +1

(7)

*

Then, substitute xC in (4) to get the vote maximizing objective function for the incumbent.
Now, let’s specify the objective function for the incumbent in such a way as to give the incentive
to trade votes in exchange for shirking (or endogenous rents):

U I = x + ( x PI − x I )

(8)
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The above function says that the incumbent maximizes both ego-rents ( x ) from holding office
and endogenous rents from legislative shirking ( ( x PI − x I ) ). The incumbent maximizes x by
choosing such a platform ( x I ) that yields x > 1 / 2 or victory in the election. The incumbent also
maximizes ( x PI − x I ) by choosing such a platform ( x I ) that increases the rents from shirking
( ( x PI − x I ) ). Thus, the incumbent maximizes U I with respect to x I , and then solves for x I in
order to get the optimal platform that guarantees his reelection. Thus, the optimal platform of the
incumbent is:
2

*

xI =

2

2

kC (kI −1)xPC − kC (kC (kI −1) + kI )(kI v + kC (kI (xPC − xPI )2 −v) − kI xPI + kCkI (xPC + xPI − kI xPI )
2

kC (kI −1) − kC (kI − 2)kI − kI

2

The above expression is the incumbent’s optimal platform x I

*

(9)

that maximizes votes and

legislative shirking simultaneously. One can substitute this expression into x or equation (4) and
plug in various parameters to see for which values the incumbent wins the election. The
incumbent wins the election if x > 1 / 2 . Because the expressions for x and x I

*

are so
*

cumbersome and complex, I use numerical simulations to determine what values x and x I can
take on for different parameter values of x PI , x PC , k I , k C , and v . Using a numerical simulation
will allow to examine what the model says about the tradeoff between vote maximizing and
legislative shirking at the optimum. Intuition should help choosing some reasonable parameter
*

values. For example, one would expect that x I should increase (i.e. shirking would decrease)
with higher values of k I and lower values of v , x PC , x PI , and k C . Let’s see if this intuition is
supported by numerical simulations.
For sufficiently small values of v and certain values of

x PC

and x PI
*

(for

dx I
> 0 and
example, v ≤ 0.1 , x PI =1/3, and x PC =2/3) the simulation results suggest that
dk I
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*

dx I
< 0 , while x is within the logical policy range [0, 1]. For lower values of v and higher
dk C
values of x PC and x PI (within the assumed restriction placed on x PC and x PI previously) these
relationships also seem to hold. However, these relationships do not hold globally when k C = k I
*

because the simulation yields no value for x I and x due to a division by zero. Otherwise, the
obtained signs make sense. One would expect that as shirking becomes more costly for the
incumbent (i.e. either k I rises or k C and v fall) and causes higher disutility to voters, the
*

incumbent will choose such platform x I that is closer to x PI (i.e. that reduces shirking). Thus,
for certain parameter values, the simulations appear to support the idea that the incumbent with
some incumbency advantage or political capital (higher k C and lower k I ) can afford to trade
some of potential votes for legislative shirking as was expected.
*

For higher values of v and x PI , however,

*

dx I
dx I
and
reverse signs. Also, for some
dk I
dk C

*

x I and x solutions do not exist because of complex numbers in square roots. Higher values of

v and x PI often result in x exceeding the assumed platform range of [0, 1]. These problems cast
doubt on the results obtained with higher values of v and x PI , which makes sense because for
sufficiently high values of v and x PI the incumbent is guaranteed a victory regardless of his or
the challenger’s proposed platforms. In other words, these bizarre results imply that competition
between the incumbent and the challenger is virtually nonexistent.
*

Another interesting simulation result shows that

*

dx I
dx I
is greater than
in absolute
dk C
dk I

value, which implies that the incumbent is likely to shirk more with higher k C than with
comparable values of k I . If incumbent can influence k C and k I via campaigning (assuming for a
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moment that k C and k I are endogenous), than the incumbent would choose negative
campaigning (i.e. to increase k C ) as his dominant strategy. With risk-averse voters, this means
that negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning.
Given the assumptions about political competition in this paper, my model shows that for
certain parameter values the incumbent would find it optimal to trade some of his votes for the
ability to shirk and would still be able to win the election. One could introduce uncertainty,
information costs, and make some variables endogenous to enrich the model. For instance, the
variances associated with the legislators and the information costs could be endogenous in the
resources that the challenger and the incumbent have and would be willing to use in
campaigning. The recent presidential campaign inspires to interpret the catchphrases like “flipflopper” and “way out of the mainstream” as attempts on the part of the incumbent to increase v
and k C for the challenger.
The model has some testable predictions. High incumbency reelection rates in themselves
may not be indicative of shirking, but they may be indicative of the incumbency advantage. The
incumbency advantage expressed in terms of electoral votes, on the other hand, may be
indicative of political capital that incumbents can spend to pursue legislative shirking or their
own ideological preferences. One can think of this incumbency advantage in terms of low k I
relative to high k C and v in my model. If an incumbent has a high level of incumbency
advantage, it means that he or she can spend much of it in exchange for shirking, which would
mean losing some votes as long as he or she can still get 51% of votes. This suggests a possible
test for legislative shirking by looking at how much victory margins incumbents give up in
exchange for shirking.
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4.3 Data Description and Empirical Estimates

My model predicts that incumbents will spend some of their victory margin or surplus votes in
exchange their ideological preferences or legislative shirking. If this is so, we should be able to
observe that an increase in the incumbency advantage does not translate into any significant
increases in votes for incumbents. Incumbents need to get only 50% plus one of the votes to win
the election. In the real world, we would have to consider the effect of uncertainty on reelection
prospects, which suggests a positive risk premium in terms of the extra votes ensuring a shirking
incumbent against losing the election in the presence of uncertainty. A shirking incumbent,
therefore, would try to get more than 51% of votes to ensure his victory. After the risk premium,
the extra votes that an incumbent can get can be spent on shirking. This line of reasoning
suggests that if there is some shirking optimization going on in the U.S. House of
Representatives, we should see no significant relationship between incumbency advantage and
incumbents’ victory margins. In addition, I also test for how changes in the incumbency
advantage affect the aggregate ideological score for Democrats and Republicans. If the
ideological score shows a significant deviation away from the median voter in response to a
larger incumbency advantage, this would suggest that efficient shirking occurs. Hence, I propose
two different hypotheses to test for the presence of shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives
at the aggregate level.

Hypothesis 1: An increase in the incumbency advantage should have no significant effect
on the share of votes incumbents win.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the incumbency advantage should have a significant effect
on incumbent’s voting platform in the direction away from the median voter (i.e. in the direction
of increasing legislative shirking).
Most of the aggregate data in this study comes from Vital Statistics on Congress by
Ornstein et al. (2002). The scarcity of some aggregate data for the U.S. House of Representatives
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puts a serious constraint on the sample size and the choice of applicable estimation techniques.
The sample used in the first hypothesis testing spans from 1958 to 2000 in two year intervals,
while the sample used in the second hypothesis testing spans from 1948 to 2000 in two year
intervals. Since this is time series data it might exhibit some dynamic properties that I need to
test for in order to choose the appropriate estimators. I also test for endogeneity issues, omitted
variable bias, and general model specification. Because of the small samples used in this paper,
the time series tests may not be very reliable. The endogeneity and model specification tests
could become more useful in this case. The tests suggest using 2SLS-IV besides in addition to
ARCH and ARIMA. I also use this diverse set of estimation techniques as a robustness check.
For the first hypothesis testing, I propose this basic OLS regression:

votes = β 0 + β1reelected + β 2 redistrict + β 3turnout + β 4 bills + β 5 swing + ε .

(10)

Where votes is the dependent variable measuring the percentage of incumbents in the U.S. house
of Representatives reelected with at least 60% of the votes, reelected is the incumbent reelection
rate, redistrict is the dummy variable controlling for redistricting, turnout is the voter turnout
rate, bills is the average number of introduced bills per Congressman, swing is the percentage of
seats that changed party. Other control variables such as the unemployment rate and real per
capita GDP are included in some regressions, but they do not change the main findings. The key
variable of interest here, however, is reelected. It represents the apparent re-election success of
incumbents (84% on average during 1948-2000) and a variety of underlying factors contributing
to it embodied in the so called incumbency advantage. If, for some reason, the incumbency
advantage rises and leads to higher incumbent re-election rates, then we might expect
incumbents to win elections with higher victory margins or higher vote shares. If there is no
statistically significant relationship between these two variables, then my first hypothesis that
incumbents give up some of their surplus votes in exchange for shirking cannot be rejected. As
evident in Table A.19, this basic OLS specification passes the link specification and omitted
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variable tests. However, the reelected variable suspected of being endogenous is likely to be
exogenous according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (Table A.19) when
instrumented with the bills and swing variables.
[Table A.19 about here]
The next step is to test for possible autocorrelation and unit root presence in the data. As
Table A.20 shows, the votes variable is trend stationary, serially uncorrelated and exhibits no
ARCH effects according to the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, BreuschGodfrey autocorrelation test, and Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity. 15 Moreover, the two series votes and reelected pass the Wald cointegration
test, Breusch-Pagan independence of residuals test, multivariate Portmanteau (Ljung-Box) white
noise in residuals test, and Omnibus multivariate normality of residuals test (Table A.20). All of
the above tests suggest that given the limited number of observations, the suggested OLS model
should do fine as a benchmark estimator for the proposed hypothesis testing.
[Table A.20 about here]
I also fit the model using the ARIMA estimator and the OLS with Newey-West standard
errors robust to heteroskedastic and AR (1) error structure. The estimates from different
regressions are presented in Table A.21 and show no significant effect of reelected on votes,
thereby failing to reject the proposed hypothesis that the higher incumbency advantage provides
incumbents with freedom to shirk more. The coefficient for reelected is positive but less than
one, which suggests that even if reelected would appear statistically significant, a rise in the
incumbency advantage would not translate one-for-one to higher victory margins since some of
this incumbency advantage would be spent on shirking. The only variable that appears

15

The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test using Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) shown in Table A.20
detects no unit root presence in the first lag, but cannot reject the unit roots in the subsequent lags. The Schwarz
criterion and Ng-Perron test shown in Table A.20 suggest that the optimal econometric model should have one lag.
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statistically significant in Table A.21 regressions is real GDP per capita, which is positively
related to the share of incumbent reelected with at least 60% of the votes.
[Table A.21 about here]
For the second hypothesis testing, I propose this basic OLS regression:

ideology = β 0 + β1reelected + β 2 redistrict + β 3turnout + β 4 bills + β 5 swing + ε .

(11)

Where ideology is the combined Democrat and Republican aggregate ideological (DNOMINATE) score for the House party coalitions that were developed by Poole and Rosenthal
(2001) and taken from Vital Statistics on Congress by Ornstein et al. (2002). All other variables
are the same as before. The ideological scores can range from -0.5 to 0.5. Poole and Rosenthal
assign the negative range to liberal ideologies and positive range to conservative ideologies. I
combine the scores for the two party coalitions by taking a simple average of their absolute
values in order to get a measure of ideological divergence that would be robust to changes in
median voter preferences. The higher is the average combined ideological score the wider is the
ideological distance between the two parties. This measure is alternative to subtracting Democrat
ideology scores (absolute value) from Republican in order to show the degree of ideological
divergence away from the median voter towards more partisan ideologies on both sides of the
spectrum.
To determine the appropriate estimator(s) for testing the second hypothesis I also utilize
the same specification, endogeneity, and time series tests. 16 The evidence presented in Table
A.19 suggests that the 2SLS-IV estimator is preferred to a single stage OLS estimator in testing

16

The abovementioned OLS model does not pass the link specification and omitted variable tests shown in Table
A.19. However, the exogeneity of the reelected variable is rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test,
first, at the 10% level of significance and then 5% level of significance when unemployment rate is included as one
of the regressors. The redistrict and swing instrumental variables appear statistically significant and negatively
related to the endogenous reelected variable. The two instrumental variables also pass the Sargan over identification
test as can be seen in Table A.19.
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the second hypothesis that a rise in the incumbency advantage leads to greater legislative
shirking reflected in the diverging ideological scores.
[Table A.19 about here]
The next step is to examine the time series aspects of this dataset. 17 The time series and
endogeneity tests indicate that the ARCH (1/1) and 2SLS-IV with Newey-West AR (1) and
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors appear as suitable estimators for testing the second
hypothesis.
[Table A.20 about here]
The estimates used in the second hypothesis testing are shown in Table A.22. All three
regressions (2SLS, 2SLS with Newey-West errors, and ARCH) in Table A.22 indicate that the

reelected variable is positively and significantly related to the combined House Democrat and
Republican ideological score. The highest statistical significance (significant at 1% level) for the

reelected variable occurs in the ARCH regressions (Column 3, Table A.22). These results appear
robust to estimation techniques and support the proposed hypothesis that a rise in the
incumbency advantage leads to more self-interested ideological pursuits by incumbents.
[Table A.22 about here]
A number of other interesting inferences can be made from the same three regressions.
Redistricting can be used by one party against another party as a tool to eliminate the toughest
competitors—the other party’s incumbents. Reinforcing this intuitive explanation is the negative
and statistically significant relationship between the redistrict and reelected variables in the
17

The Wald and the likelihood ratio cointegration tests shown in Table A.20 suggest that the two series, ideology
and reelected, appear to be cointegrated. When the two series are non-stationary, but a linear combination of them is
stationary, they are said to be cointegrated. In fact, both the ideology series and its residuals do not pass the KPSS
trend stationary test. However, the ideology series passes the Breusch-Pagan independence of residuals test,
multivariate Portmanteau (Ljung-Box) white noise in residuals test, and Omnibus test of multivariate normality of
residuals as shown in Table A.20. However, the DF-GLS test shows unit root presence in the series and the
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity indicates significant ARCH effects
(Table A.20) suggesting using an ARCH estimator. The Schwarz criterion (7) and modified AIC (1) tests show in
Table A.20 disagree on the optimal number of lags that should be included in the model. Given the small number of
observations, I lean towards the smaller lag suggested by AIC.
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2SLS-IV regressions (Columns 1 and 2, Table A.22). Also, the swing variable is a significant
instrument for the reelected variable suggesting that structural changes or shifts in the
ideological preferences of voters have a negative effect on the incumbent reelection rates
(possibly working through the same redistricting mechanism). Another significant variable that is
negatively related to the combined average ideology score is voter turnout (Column 2, Table
A.22). The rational voter model developed by Downs (1957) suggests that if voters observe a
significant difference between the candidates, they have more incentives to show up to vote in
that election. Thus, the more dissatisfied the voters are the more likely they are to show up to
vote, which forces the opposing parties to scale back their ideological departures from the
median voter. This provides additional support for my argument that the higher the incumbency
induced ideological divide (legislative shirking) leads to greater voter turnout in subsequent
elections as statistically significantly observed only in the regressions accounting for
autoregressive error structure (Columns 2 and 3, Table A.22). Another statistically significant
variable in all three regressions in Table A.22 that is negatively related to the combined average
ideology score is the average number of bills introduced per Congressman. This relationship has
a very intuitive explanation. As the ideological divide between the two House parties grows, it
becomes harder to strike a consensus and pass the newly introduced bills. This is an example of
reverse causality issue though.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

This paper examines the implications of the incumbency advantage for legislative shirking. The
model developed in this paper rests on the assumption that incumbents in determining their
optimal political platform face a tradeoff between maximizing votes and perusing their own
ideological preferences while in office. As a result, incumbents are willing to sacrifice some
surplus votes in exchange for engaging in legislative shirking. Numerical simulations show that
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for some reasonable parameter values an incumbent can trade some surplus votes for being able
to enact a political platform that is closer to his ideological preferences rather than to his/her
constituents.
This empirical analysis of aggregate data for the U.S. House of Representatives supports
the model’s prediction that incumbents sacrifice some of their surplus votes in exchange for
shirking or implementing legislation closer to their own ideological preferences. I find evidence
that a rise in the incumbent reelection rates leads to greater ideological departure from the
median voter preferences in the U.S. House of Representatives. Overall, the evidence in this
paper suggests that an increase in the incumbency advantage exacerbates the agency problem
between legislators and their constituents. In other words, the empirical evidence suggests that
the electoral market for the U.S. House of Representatives is not very effective in preventing
incumbents from legislative shirking.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions
The field of political economy addresses a variety of interesting and relevant issues within the
nexus between political and economic forces, and the existing research on political regimes and
their effects on government policy and economic well-being is both vast and impressive.
Nonetheless, not all of the questions in this field have been completely answered, and not all of
its puzzles have been resolved. Therefore, any new piece of knowledge that is added to this field
can help its scholars to uncover the new inner workings of the world and can also provide them
with new areas for further study. My dissertation is no exception to this rule. This is how the
progress is made, and the frontier of knowledge is pushed even farther.
The previous chapters of my dissertation intend to answer the following three general
questions: (1) Do political and economic freedoms affect the value of life in military conflicts
through military capital intensity? (2) How do arms trade and military spending affect economic
growth? (3) Does the incumbency advantage increase the level of legislative shirking in the
representative democracy? While these may appear as seemingly unrelated issues, they do
intersect when one thinks about how different political forces come together to influence military
expenditures, which affect battlefield casualties, economic growth, and general well-being. Some
creative theoretical modeling and sophisticated econometric techniques are used to answer these
questions.
To answer the first question, I develop a theoretical model to analyze if democracies and
dictatorships, with volunteer or conscription army, value life differently in military conflicts. The
model allows for formal theoretical insights into how economic and institutional factors may
affect military capital intensity and subsequent combat casualties. The empirical evidence
presented in this work supports the model's prediction that more democratic nations with
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volunteer armies experience lower conflict casualties due to higher military capital intensity.
Higher reliance on conscription leads to lower military capital intensity, while higher real GDP
per capita leads to higher military capital intensity. Economic freedom is found to be thirteen
times more potent than democracy in increasing military capital intensity. One intriguing finding
is that political and economic freedoms converge in their effects on military capital intensity and
battlefield deaths in the long-run.
Following the Dunne et al. (2005) suggestion to study the growth effects of military
spending in the Solow and Barro growth models, I answer the second question and bring the new
evidence I discover into the old "butter vs. guns" debate. I accomplish this by controlling for the
interaction between arms trade and military spending, and I use sophisticated econometric
techniques to show how the two variables interact to influencing economic growth. I find that
higher military spending and net arms exports result in lower economic growth, but higher
military spending is less detrimental to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. I also
find that democratic regimes are inversely related to the size of military spending as a share of
GDP, which provides some economic explanation for why democracy appears to be correlated
with per capita income.
To answer the third question, I develop a theoretical model to analyze the implications of
incumbency advantage for legislative shirking. The model shows that an incumbent finds it
optimal to spend some surplus votes on legislative shirking in the presence of risk-averse voters.
The empirical estimates, based on the aggregate time series data for the U.S. House of
Representatives, show that a rise in the incumbent reelection rate increases the ideological
departure of incumbents from the median voter. Additional empirical estimates indicate that a
change in the incumbency advantage has no significant effect on the share of votes that
incumbents win. This evidence suggests that the incumbency advantage leads to more legislative
shirking, as evidenced by the departure from the median voter ideological preference. This
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evidence suggests that representative democracy can be vulnerable to rent-seeking or
ideologically driven legislation in the presence of significant incumbency advantage.
The above chapters provide analyses of several important issues that are typically
addressed under the realm of political economy. By applying standard economic theory and
sophisticated econometric techniques, I have secured some interesting findings on the inner
workings of democracy and its affects on military spending and economic growth. My results
confirm that political regimes play an important role in government policy formulation and
economic well-being. However, a democratic regime, with all of its benefits, may not be a good
substitute for the free market since politicians have strong incentives to pursue their own agendas
at the expense of public interests. Important knowledge might be gained by analyzing the
dynamic properties of conflict under different political regimes. An empirical analysis of what
determines arms exports would also be warranted.
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Appendix
Table A.1
Variable Description and Sources (Pooled Sample)
Variable Name
(source)

Democracy (1)

Conscription (2)

Economic Freedom (2)

GDP/Capita (3)
(Residual)

Population (3)

ME/Mil. Personnel (4)

Capability (4)

Urban
Population (4)
Duration (5)

Description
Democracy score consists of the two indexes (DEMOC) and (AUTOC)
taken from Polity IV database and combined according to the formula
[(DEMOCi-AUTOCi)+10]/2 that is used extensively in the literature.
These two 11-point indexes of political regimes are based on formal
constraints on the executive (AUTOC) and institutional support for
democracy (DEMOC).
Index of reliance on military conscription (0-10). A rating of 10
assigned to countries without military conscription. The index is
subtracted 10 and multiplying by (-1) for easier interpretation. Since
conscription is available in 5-year intervals, average values are used
for those conflicts that fall between the intervals.
The freedom index identifies seven broad areas of economic freedom.
It is available in 5-year intervals from 1970 to 1995 for some 123
countries. Average values are used for those conflicts that fall between
the intervals. Since conscription is a component of the economic
freedom index, it is factored out from the index.
Real GDP per capita (chained) in the first year of conflict. Residual
from regressing real GDP/Capita on democracy and economic
freedom indexes is used in the regressions to avoid biasing the
estimates. GDP/Capita is used as a proxy for relative capital
abundance (wealth) in a given country.
Country population (in thousands) in the first year of conflict. Since
countries with larger populations may arguably experience more
casualties, it is reasonable to normalize conflict deaths by dividing it
by a country’s population.
Military expenditures (in constant dollars) divided by military
personnel, in the first year of conflict. This variable is a proxy for
capital intensity of military forces given the limitations of military
data.
Capability variable is the Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC) in the first year of conflict. It is computed as the weighted
average of a state’s total population, urban population, iron and steel
production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military
expenditure during 1816-2001.
Country’s urban population (in thousands) in the first year of conflict.
Urban population may proxy for a number of factors like education,
life expectancy, industrialization, development, and concentrated
availability of citizens who could be easier mobilized during conflict.
Conflict duration measured in calendar years from the first year to the
last.

Civil War (5)

Dummy variable for civil war.

Deaths (5)

The best available estimate of the total number of battlefield deaths
(both military and civilian) for a given country in a given conflict.
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Mean
(st. dev.)
5.88
(3.82)

5.41
(4.52)

5.56
(1.25)

5,834
(6,487)

126,010
(245,149)
16,535
(30,481)

0.03
(0.05)

20,207
(33,109)
5.50
(6.71)
0.63
(0.48)
4,671
(19,176)

1. Polity IV Project. 2000. Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800–2000. Electronic data.
(version p4v2000). College Park, Md.: CIDCM, University of Maryland.
2. Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson (2004). Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual Report.
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com.
3. Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
4. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and
Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.
5. Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 2002.
“Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset”, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637.
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Democracy
Conscription
Freedom
GDP/Capita

Table A.2
Correlation Matrix (Pooled Sample)
Democracy
Conscription Freedom
1.0000
-0.2625
1.0000
0.5650
-0.1043
1.0000
0.6272
-0.0294
0.7357

GDP/Capita

1.0000

Table A.3
Correlation Matrix (Cross-Country Average Sample)
Democracy
Conscription Freedom GDP/Capita
Democracy
1.0000
Conscription
-0.0494
1.0000
Freedom
0.6231
-0.0118
1.0000
GDP/Capita
0.7384
0.0805
0.7418
1.0000
Table A.4
Single-Stage Robust Regressions (Dep. Var.: Deaths/Conflict Duration)
Sample: Pooled
Sample: Cross-Country
Estimator
Robust
Robust
-2.96
-21.27***
Democracy
(1.99)
(7.99)
Economic
-21.89**
2.40
Freedom
(8.79)
(28.94)
3.32**
-3.81
Conscription
(1.53)
(4.26)
GDP/Capita
-0.01***
-0.01
(Residual)
(0.00)
(0.01)
396**
4,932***
Capability
(168)
(719)
27.58**
-119**
Civil War
(12.94)
(54)
0.00
-0.00
ME/Mil. Personnel
(0.00)
(0.00)
147***
323*
Constant
(40)
(163)
F-statistic
5.14***
11.07***
Observations
169
75
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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Table A.5
Single-Stage Regression Specification Tests (After OLS Estimation)
Sample: Pooled
Sample: Cross-country
Observations
169
75
Link test for model specification:
Prob > F
0.00
0.00
R-squared
0.15
0.21
y_hat
0.19
0.05
(0.38)
(0.62)
y_hatsq
0.0005**
0.0009
(0.0002)
(0.0005)
Ramsey RESET test--Ho: model has no omitted variables:
Prob > F
0.01
0.23
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.

1

Table A.6
Testing for Endogeneity of Military Capital Intensity (After 2SLS-IV procedure)
H0: Regressor is exogenous
Observations: 196
Wu-Hausman F test
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq
Sample: Pooled
test
1
P-value
0.02073
0.01723
P-value2
0.05566
0.05159

Instruments used: democracy.
Instruments used: democracy, economic freedom, conscription, GDP/capita (Residual).

2
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Table A.7
Determinants of Battlefield Deaths, Pooled Sample, 1950-2002
(1)
2SLS-IV
(OLS)

(2)
2SLS-IV
(OLS)

(3)
2SLS-IV
(Robust)

(4)
2SLS-IV
(Median)

(5)
2SLS-IV
(Median)

-382***
(140)
-117,626***
(22,506)
3,919**
(1,952)
0.24***
(0.03)
3,147***
(240)

-92
(70)
-47,988**
(16,762)
298
(1,020)
0.05**
(0.02)
508***
(147)
8,328***
(435)
-434***
(100)
2.06***
(0.10)
-34,447***
(2,600)
150.82***
-

-139
(134)
-104,638***
(25,843)
-339
(2,042)
0.08**
(0.03)
638**
(292)
13,999***
(860)
-877***
(199)
3.15***
(0.19)
-63,991***
(5,134)
0.47

Deaths

Deaths

-139
(134)
-104,638***
(25,843)
-339
(2,042)
0.08**
(0.03)
638**
(292)
13,999***
(860)
-877***
(199)
3.15***
(0.19)
-63,991***
(5,134)
0.47
Deaths/
Mil.
Personnel

1st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable: ME/Mil. Personnel

Economic Freedom

-

Conscription

-

GDP/Capita
(Residual)

4.66***
(0.17)
11,540***
(1,610)
154.77***
0.75

-406**
(201)
-187,420***
(48,341)
1,639
(2,941)
0.20***
(0.05)
-260
(424)
19,940***
(1,254)
-1,804***
(289)
4.45***
(0.29)
-97,209***
(7,489)
82.28***
0.81

Deaths

Deaths

Duration
Capability
Civil War
Urban
Population
Democracy

Constant
F-statistic
R-squared

2st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable:

-0.09***
-0.07***
-0.003***
-0.003***
-0.00006***
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.00001)
1,093***
599***
-4.51**
32.47***
0.13***
Duration
(373)
(189)
(1.61)
(2.87)
(0.05)
16,863
51,430
1,977***
1,349**
-7.26
Capability
(16,145)
(48,957)
(380)
(683)
(11)
485
980
79***
114**
1.35**
Civil War
(1,187)
(1,079)
(24)
(42)
(0.71)
Urban
-0.03*
-0.05*
-0.0006*
-0.00
-0.00003***
Population
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.0004)
(0.00)
(0.00001)
167
1,290
94***
53
3.07***
Constant
(704)
(782)
(24)
(41)
(0.68)
F-statistic
3.90***
4.16***
11.39***
R-squared
0.16
0.17
0.01
0.01
Observations
311
169
169
169
169
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The OLS regressions use robust standard errors to
correct for heteroskedasticity. Pseudo R-squared are reported for median regressions. Significance levels:
*** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) for
regression (2) has a P-value of 0.42 implying that the instruments cannot be rejected.
ME/Mil. Personnel
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Table A.8
Determinants of Battlefield Deaths, Cross-Country Sample, 1950-2002
(6)
2SLS-IV
(OLS)

(7)
2SLS-IV
(OLS)

(8)
2SLS-IV
(Robust)

(9)
2SLS-IV
(Median)

(10)
2SLS-IV
(Median)

64
(186)
10,3170
(66,551)
6,063**
(2,947)
0.07
(0.09)
3,440***
(292)

-73.58***
(230)
68,701
(68,773)
4,822
(3,102)
0.12
(0.10)
2,199***
(394)
8,082***
(1,469)
-531**
(247)
3.07***
(0.32)
-40,582***
(9,373)
40.54***
0.83

60
(116)
255,999
(168,335)
526
(1,566)
-0.20
(0.15)
1,706***
(202)
4,578***
(763)
-277**
(125)
1.82***
(0.17)
-18,138***
(4,836)
54.76***
-

21
(174)
194,556***
(26,190)
818
(2,296)
-0.12**
(0.05)
2,421***
(305)
4,508***
(1,079)
-366*
(198)
2.32***
(0.26)
-17,109**
(6,959)
0.58

21
(174)
194,556***
(26,190)
818
(2,296)
-0.12**
(0.05)
2,421***
(305)
4,508***
(1,079)
-366*
(198)
2.32***
(0.26)
-17,109**
(6,959)
0.58

1st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable: ME/Mil. Personnel
Duration
Capability
Civil War
Urban
Population
Democracy
Economic Freedom

-

Conscription

-

GDP/Capita
(Residual)

2.83***
(0.27)
6,895***
(2,481)
54.48***
0.81

Constant
F-statistic
R-squared

2st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable:

Deaths/Mil.
Personnel
-0.33**
-0.13**
-0.03***
-0.04**
-0.0005**
ME/Mil. Personnel
(0.16)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.0001)
2,240**
501**
41**
131***
0.68
Duration
(1,060)
(200)
(17)
(44)
(0.83)
135,101**
65,360***
36,992***
41,544***
294*
Capability
(67,560)
(8,692)
(163)
(18,489)
(6,259)
6,396
1,977
-544**
-324
13
Civil War
(4,071)
(1,396)
(233)
(602)
(11)
Urban
-0.07
-0.04
-0.01**
-0.02*
-0.00
Population
(0.08)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
-6,418
598
820***
660
8.54
Constant
(5,232)
(1,187)
(215)
(552)
(9.87)
F-statistic
1.30
7.09***
16.13***
R-squared
0.27
0.19
0.07
0.02
Observations
84
75
75
75
75
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The OLS regressions use robust standard errors to
correct for heteroskedasticity. Pseudo R-squared are reported for median regressions. Significance levels:
*** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) for
regression (7) has a P-value of 0.33 implying that the instruments cannot be rejected.
Deaths

Deaths
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Deaths

Deaths

Table A.9
Featured Conflicts and Their Participants, Pooled Sample
Conflict Case
Algeria (FIS)
Algeria v. Morocco 1963
Angola (UNITA) I
Angolan Independence
Argentina (ERP, Montoneros)
Argentina (Military) 1963
Argentina vs UK 1982
Azerbaijan (OPON)
Bangaldesh (Chittagong Hill Insurgency)
Bolivia (ELN)
Brunei rebellion v. UK
Burkina Faso (Popular Front)
Burkina Faso v. Mali 1985
Burundi Civil War 1990
Cambodian Civil War I
Cameroon (Military Faction)
Cameroon Independence
Cameroon v. Nigeria 1996
Chad v. Libya 1987
Chad v. Nigeria 1983
Chadian Civil War I
Chadian Civil War II
Chile (Military Faction)
China v. Burma 1969
China v. India 1962
China v. Taiwan 1952-5
China v. Taiwan 1958
China v. USSR 1969
China v. Vietnam 1978-9
China v. Vietnam 1980-1
China v. Vietnam 1983-4
China v. Vietnam 1986-8
Congo/Zaire (Katanga)
Cuba (National Revolutionary Council)
Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots & Turkey)
Dominican Republic (Military Faction)
Ecuador v. Peru 1995
Egypt (Islamists)
Egypt v. UK 1951-2
El Salvador (Military Faction)
El Salvador v. Honduras 1969
Ethiopia (Eritrea)
Ethiopia (Military Faction)
Ethiopia (Oromiya) II
Ethiopia Civil War 1976-91
Ethiopia v. Somalia 1973
Ethiopia v. Somalia 1983
Ethiopia v. Somalia 1987
Gabon (Military faction)
Ghana (Military Faction) 1983
Ghana (Military faction) 1966
Ghana (Military faction) 1981

Fre
q.
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1

Perce
nt
0.32
0.64
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.64
0.96
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32

Conflict Case
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 2000-1
Iran v. Iraq 1974
Iraq v. Kuwait & Multinational Coalition
Israel v. Egypt 1969-70
Israel v. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria 19
Israel v. Egypt, Syria 1973
Israel, UK & France v. Egypt 1956
Kenya (Military faction) 1982
Korean War
Laos Civil War II
Laos v. Thailand 1986-8
Lebanon (Independent Nasserites)
Lebanon Civil War 1975-90
Madagascar (Monima Nations)
Malaysia (CCO)
Malaysia (CPM) 1974-5
Malaysia (CPM) 1981
Mali (Tuareg Insurgency) 1990
Mali (Tuareg Insurgency) 1994
Mau Mau Rebellion
Mexico (Chiapas) 1994
Morocco (Military faction) 1971
Mozambique Civil War 1976-92
Mozambique Indep.
Namibia Indep.
Nepal (Nepali Congress) 1960-2
Nepal Civil War 1997-2002
Nicaragua (Contras) 1981-9
Nicaragua (FSLN) 1978-9
Niger (Toubou) 1996-7
Niger (Tuareg Insurgency) 1990-2
Niger (Tuareg Insurgency) 1994
Niger (Tuareg Insurgency) 1997
Nigeria (Biafra)
Nigeria (Military faction) 1966
Oman (Dhofar Rebellion)
Oman Civil Strife 1957
Pakistan (Baluchi Insurgency)
Pakistan (East Pakistan)
Pakistan (Islamists)
Panama (Military faction)
Panama v. USA 1989
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) 1989-90
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) 1992-6
Paraguay (Military faction) 1954
Paraguay (Military faction) 1989
Peru (MIR , Tpac Amaru , ELN) 1965-6
Peru (Sendero Luminoso)
Philippines (Mindanao) 1970-90
Philippines (Mindanao) 1993-2002
Philippines (NPA) 1972-95
Philippines (NPA) 1997
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Fre
q.
1
1
22
2
4
5
4
1
13
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Perce
nt
0.32
0.32
7.07
0.64
1.29
1.61
1.29
0.32
4.18
0.32
0.32
0.32
1.29
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.96
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32

Table A.9
Featured Conflicts and Their Participants (Continued)
Grenada (US Invasion)
Guatemala (Conservative Coup and
Army)
Guatemalan Civil War (1965-95)
Guinea (Military Faction) 2000
Guinea (Military faction) 1970
Guinea Bissau Independence
Haiti 1991
Honduras v. Nicaragua 1957
India (Assam)
India (Jarkhand) 1993
India (Kashmir)
India (Manipur Insurgency) 1982-9
India (Manipur Insurgency) 1991-4
India (Manipur Insurgency) 1997-2000
India (Mizoram) 1966-8
India (NNC, NSCN) 1956-9
India (NNC, NSCN) 1961-8
India (NNC, NSCN) 1989-97
India (Naxalites & CPI-M) 1967-72
India (Naxalites, PWG, MCC) 1989-94
India (Naxalites, PWG, MCC) 1996-2002
India (Sikh Insurgency)
India (Tripura Insurgency) 1978-88
India (Tripura Insurgency) 1993
India (Tripura Insurgency) 1995-2002
India v. Pakistan 1964
India v. Pakistan 1965
India v. Pakistan 1984
India v. Pakistan 1987
India v. Pakistan 1989-90
India v. Pakistan 1992
India v. Pakistan 1996-2002
Indonesia (Aceh) 1989-91
Indonesia (Aceh) 1999-2002
Indonesia (East Timor) 1975-89
Indonesia (East Timor) 1992
Indonesia (East Timor) 1997-8
Indonesia (West Papua) 1965
Indonesia (West Papua) 1976-8
Iran (Kurdish Insurgency) 1966-8
Iran (Kurdish Insurgency) 1990
Iran (Kurdish Insurgency) 1993
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 1986-8
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 1991-3
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 1991-3

1

0.32

Philippines (NPA) 1999-2002

1

0.32

1

0.32

Russia (Parliamentary forces)

1

0.32

1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.31

Rwanda Civil War 1990-4
Rwanda Civil War 1998-2002
Senegal (Casamance) 1990
Senegal (Casamance) 1992-3
Senegal (Casamance) 1995
Senegal (Casamance) 1997-2001
Sierra Leone Civil War 1991-2000
Somalia Civil War 1981-96
South Africa Civil War 1991-93
Spain & France vs. Moroccan insurgency
Spain (ETA) 1980-1
Spain (ETA) 1987
Spain (ETA) 1991-2
Sri Lanka (JVP) 1971
Sri Lanka (JVP) 1989-90
Sri Lanka (Tamil Insurgency) 1983-2001
Syria (Military faction) 1966
Syria (Muslim Brotherhood) 1966
Tajikistan (Movement for Peace) 1998
Thailand (CPT) 1970-82
Thailand (Military faction)
Togo (MTD) 1986
Tunisia (Tunisienne Restance Army)
Tunisia v. France 1961
Turkey (Devrimci Sol)
Turkey (Kurdish Insurgency)
UK v. Cypriot Insurgents
UK v. S Yemen Insurgency
US v. Puerto Rican Nationalists
Uganda (Military faction) 1971
Uganda (Military faction) 1977
Uganda (UPA) 1972
Uganda Civil War 1978-9
Uganda Civil War 1981-91
Uganda Civil War 1994-2002
United Kingdom (N. Ireland) 1971-93
United Kingdom (N. Ireland) 1998
Venezuela (Military faction) 1962
Vietnam War
Western Sahara Insurgency
Yemen (Royalists) 1962-70
Yemen Civil War 1994
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
21
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
6
2
1
1
17

Total

311

0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
6.75
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.64
1.93
0.64
0.32
0.32
5.47
100.
00

Notes: “Best” estimates of total battlefield deaths for a country or country’s military in the above conflicts are
used in both samples in this paper. The cross-country sample uses country averages of these battle deaths. Data
source: Polity IV Project.
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Table A.10
Countries Featured in the Average Cross-Country Sample
Algeria
Guinea
Peru
Angola
Haiti
Philippines
Argentina
Honduras
Poland
Australia
Hungary
Portugal
Azerbaijan
India
Russia
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Rwanda
Belgium
Iran
Senegal
Bolivia
Israel
Sierra Leone
Botswana
Italy
South Africa
Burkina Faso
Jordan
Spain
Burundi
Kenya
Sri Lanka
Cameroon
Madagascar
Sweden
Canada
Malaysia
Syria
Chad
Mali
Taiwan
Chile
Mauritania
Tajikistan
China
Mexico
Tanzania
Colombia
Morocco
Thailand
Czech Republic
Mozambique
Togo
Denmark
Nepal
Tunisia
Ecuador
Netherlands
Turkey
Egypt
New Zealand
Uganda
El Salvador
Nicaragua
United Kingdom
Ethiopia
Niger
United States
France
Nigeria
Venezuela
Gabon
Norway
Yemen
Germany
Pakistan
Zimbabwe
Ghana
Panama
Total number of countries: 84*
Greece
Papua New Guinea
Guatemala
Paraguay
* When dropped, missing values for the economic freedom index and conscription index reduce this
sample to 75 countries.
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Table A.11
Variable Description and Summary Statistics
Variable
Name

Variable Description

growthit (2)

Non-overlapping five-year average growth rate of real GDP per capita
(Laspeyres).

yit-1 (2)

Real GDP per capita in the year preceding the five-year average period.

sit (2)

Five-year average investment as a share of GDP (Laspeyres).

nit+g+δ (2)

Five-year average population growth rate n + 0.05 (the assumed value for
g+δ).

popgit (2)

Five-year average population growth rate.

hit (6)

Average number of years of schooling for both sexes 25 years of age or
older.

mit (5)

Five-year average military expenditure as a share of GDP.

naxit (4)

Five-year average of net arms exports computed as (arms exports - arms
imports)/ (arms exports + arms imports), all in current values.
Five-year average of net arms exports computed as (arms exports - arms
imports)/ (arms exports + arms imports). Set equal to zero when the value is
negative.
Five-year average of net arms imports computed as (arms imports - arms
exports)/ (arms exports + arms imports). Set equal to zero when the value is
negative.
Democracy score. Consists of the two indexes (DEMOC) and (AUTOC)
taken from Polity IV database and combined according to the commonly
used formula [(DEMOCi-AUTOCi)+10]/2.

naxposit
namposit
demit (1)
popit (2)

Natural log of total country population.

Mean
(Std. Dev.)
2.46
(2.17)
9.09
(0.80)
21.42
(6.36)
1.83
(0.15)
1.27
(0.94)
6.59
(2.63)
3.69
(3.13)
-0.39
(0.63)
0.14
(0.28)
0.53
(0.41)
2.01
(0.63)
17.19
(1.23)

Natural log of the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). It is
computed as the weighted average of a state’s total population, urban
cincit (3)
population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military
personnel, and military
-4.74
Expenditure.
(1.14)
1. Polity IV Project. 2000. Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800–2000. Electronic data.
(version p4v2000). College Park, Md.: CIDCM, University of Maryland.
2. Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
3. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and
Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-8.
4. Compiled from various issues of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) by the

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
5. Compiled by Dunne et al. (2004) from Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks.
6. Barro and Lee (1994) data can be found at: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
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Figure A.1
Arms Trade in Developed Countries: 1989-1999
Arms Exports

Arms Imports

70,000
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1994
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1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Country
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
India
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Malaysia
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
Total

Table A.12
Countries Featured in the Sample
Freq.
Percent
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
7
3.57
196
100.00

88

Cum.
3.57
7.14
10.71
14.29
17.86
21.43
25.00
28.57
32.14
35.71
39.29
42.86
46.43
50.00
53.57
57.14
60.71
64.29
67.86
71.43
75.00
78.57
82.14
85.71
89.29
92.86
96.43
100.00

Table A.13
Pair-wise Correlations of Variables
lnyit-1
ln(nit+g+δ)
lnsit
lnhit

lnhit
lnmit
naxit
demit

growth
1.0000
-0.2037*
0.3323*
-0.0496
-0.0940
-0.0074
-0.0830
-0.0972

1.0000
0.5713*
-0.6735*
0.8257*
-0.0006
0.4461*
0.3464*

1.0000
-0.4499*
0.4900*
0.0289
0.1480*
0.1495*

1.0000
-0.5208*
0.0969
-0.3872*
-0.2760*

popit

0.0238

-0.3552*

-0.3356*

0.1499*

cincit

-0.0298

0.1168

-0.0578

-0.1424*

growthit
lnyit-1

lnsit
ln(nit+g+δ)

* Significant at 5%.
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1.0000
0.1200
0.3651*
0.3489*
0.2815*
0.0079

lnmit

1.0000
0.0574
-0.0966
0.3010*
-0.1184

naxit

1.0000
0.2704*
0.1878*
0.4132*

Table A.14
The Growth Effects of Military Spending and Net Arms Exports in the Augmented Solow
Growth Model
1
2
3
4
lnyit-1
-5.28***
-5.32***
-5.51***
0.72***
(0.54)
(0.56)
(0.56)
(0.06)
lnsit
4.51***
4.59***
4.78***
0.30***
(0.31)
(0.37)
(0.37)
(0.03)
-4.28***
-2.96**
-2.17
-0.21**
ln(nit + g + δ)
(1.28)
(1.39)
(1.40)
(0.08)
lnhit
0.23
-0.12
-0.17
0.03
(0.57)
(0.63)
(0.62)
(0.07)
lnmit
-1.53***
-2.16***
-1.71***
-0.09**
(0.48)
(0.51)
(0.54)
(0.04)
lnmit-1
0.49
1.17***
0.80*
-0.01
(0.44)
(0.43)
(0.45)
(0.04)
-0.32
-1.03***
-0.01
naxit
(0.24)
(0.38)
(0.02)
-0.33
-0.28
0.01
naxit-1
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.02)
0.63**
-0.01
(naxit)( lnmit)
(0.27)
(0.02)
35.54***
36.55***
35.80***
0.01
Constant
(7.78)
(10.39)
(11.19)
(0.01)
Estimator
FGLS
FGLS
FGLS
GMM
F-test (Prob>F)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Sargan test (p-level)
0.74
Arellano-Bond (p-level)
0.84
Observations
196
196
196
140
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000.
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted DurbinWatson computation. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no second-order autocorrelation in
the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with Huber-White sandwich. Instruments
include: dem, pop, cinc.
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Table A.15
The Growth Effects of Military Spending and Net Arms Exports in the Reformulated
Barro Growth Model
1
2
3
4
lnyit-1
-5.18***
-5.26***
-5.41***
0.67***
(0.55)
(0.55)
(0.57)
(0.09)
0.25***
0.25***
0.26***
0.02***
sit
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.00)
-0.85***
-0.83***
-0.78***
-0.03*
popgit
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.23)
(0.02)
lnhit
-1.01
-0.76
-0.82
0.04
(0.62)
(0.64)
(0.64)
(0.08)
-0.08**
-0.09**
-0.05
-0.01
mit
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.01)
-0.36
-0.51*
-0.02
naxit
(0.24)
(0.30)
(0.02)
0.04
0.00
(naxit)(mit)
(0.06)
(0.00)
37.61***
38.47***
38.82***
0.02
Constant
(7.95)
(7.95)
(8.34)
(0.01)
Estimator
FGLS
FGLS
FGLS
GMM
F-test (Prob>F)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Sargan test (p-level)
0.89
Arellano-Bond (p-level)
0.33
Observations
196
196
196
140
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000.
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted DurbinWatson computation. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no second-order autocorrelation in
the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with Huber-White sandwich. Instruments
include: dem, pop, cinc.
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Table A.16
The Effects of Military Spending, Net Arms Exports and Imports on Growth in the
Augmented Solow Growth Model
5
6
7
8
lnyit-1
-4.83***
-5.18***
-2.94***
0.69***
(0.55)
(0.53)
(0.40)
(0.07)
lnsit
4.34***
4.91***
4.65***
0.29***
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.56)
(0.03)
-2.14
-1.59
-4.04***
-0.18**
ln(nit + g + δ)
(1.48)
(1.37)
(1.38)
(0.08)
lnhit
-0.29
-0.91
1.15**
0.04
(0.65)
(0.61)
(0.55)
(0.07)
lnmit
-2.72***
-3.13***
-2.16**
-0.09**
(0.53)
(0.63)
(0.87)
(0.04)
lnmit-1
1.55***
1.34***
0.87
-0.00
(0.43)
(0.46)
(0.67)
(0.05)
0.15
-2.20***
-2.83
-0.07
naxposit
(0.42)
(0.60)
(1.80)
(0.06)
0.29
0.29
1.03
0.04
naxposit-1
(0.36)
(0.30)
(0.72)
(0.04)
0.62**
0.18
-1.34
0.00
namposit
(0.33)
(0.55)
(0.96)
(0.03)
0.98***
0.83***
0.06
-0.00
namposit-1
(0.35)
(0.31)
(0.51)
(0.05)
2.83***
2.54*
0.10
(naxposit)(lnmit)
(0.50)
(1.33)
(0.10)
0.26
1.44*
0.03
(namposit)(lnmit)
(0.39)
(0.76)
(0.03)
30.05***
26.97***
21.57***
0.01
Constant
(8.43)
(7.78)
(4.79)
(0.01)
Estimator
FGLS
FGLS
GLS-RE
GMM
F-test (Prob>F)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Hausman test (Prob>chi2)
0.00
Baltagi-Wu LBI
2.32
(Durbin-Watson statistic)
(2.06)
Sargan test (p-level)
0.99
Arellano-Bond (p-level)
0.81
Observations
196
196
196
140
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000.
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted DurbinWatson computation. Random effects (GLS-RE) regression estimated with GLS and AR (1) error
structure. The Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic is equivalent to the Durbin-Watson statistic: if it is far below 2.00
then a correction for serial correlation is necessary. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no
second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with
Huber-White sandwich. Instruments include: dem, pop, cinc.
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Table A.17
The Growth Effects of Military Spending, Net Arms Exports and Imports in the
Reformulated Barro Growth Model
5
6
7
8
lnyit-1
-5.02***
-5.29***
-2.61***
0.63***
(0.56)
(0.57)
(0.37)
(0.09)
0.24***
0.27***
0.22***
0.01***
sit
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.00)
-0.81***
-0.69***
-0.63***
0.04
popgit
(0.22)
(0.23)
(0.21)
(0.08)
lnhit
-0.77
-1.09*
0.91*
-0.03
(0.65)
(0.65)
(0.52)
(0.02)
-0.10**
-0.13
-0.17
-0.01
mit
(0.04)
(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.01)
0.41
-0.60
-1.59
-0.06
naxposit
(.41)
(0.62)
(1.41)
(0.05)
0.82**
0.71
-0.82
0.02
namposit
(0.32)
(0.44)
(0.68)
(0.02)
0.40***
0.55*
0.03
(naxposit)(mit)
(0.15)
(0.30)
(0.02)
0.03
0.17
0.00
(namposit)(mit)
(0.08)
(0.15)
(0.00)
34.08
21.22***
0.03*
Constant
(8.28)
(2.93)
(0.01)
Estimator
FGLS
FGLS
GLS-RE
GMM
F-test (Prob>F)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Hausman test (Prob>chi2)
0.00
Baltagi-Wu LBI
2.23
(Durbin-Watson statistic)
(1.95)
Sargan test (p-level)
0.98
Arellano-Bond (p-level)
0.22
Observations
196
196
196
140
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000.
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted DurbinWatson computation. Random effects (GLS-RE) regression estimated with GLS and AR (1) error
structure. The Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic is equivalent to the Durbin-Watson statistic: if it is far below 2.00
then a correction for serial correlation is necessary. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no
second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with
Huber-White sandwich. Instruments include: dem, pop, cinc.
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Table A.18
Link and Omitted Variable Tests of the Solow and Barro Style Regressions
Solow
Barro
Link test for model specification:
Prob > F
0.00
0.00
R-squared
0.68
0.65
y_hat
0.95***
0.91***
(0.09)
(0.10)
y_hatsq
0.01
0.02
(0.01)
(0.02)
Ramsey RESET test--Ho: model has no omitted variables:
Prob > F
0.13
0.12
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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Table A.19
Link Specification, Omitted Variable, and Endogeneity Tests
Hypothesis/Model 1
Hypothesis/Model 2
Link test for model specification (after OLS)
P-value
0.01
0.00
R-squared
0.42
0.79
-0.71
-3.47**
y_hat
(6.50)
(1.36)
1.24
7.53***
y_hatsq
(4.71)
(2.28)
Ramsey RESET test—H0: model has no omitted variables
P-value
0.75
0.01
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test—H0: reelected variable is exogenous
P-value
0.68
0.08†
Sargan over-identification test of all instruments
P-value
0.33
0.86
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
†
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P-value is 0.04 and Sargan test’s P-value is 0.85 when unemployment rate
is included as a regressor in the 2SLS-IV regression.
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Table A.20
Autocorrelation and Unit Root Tests
Hypothesis/Model 1
Hypothesis/Model 2
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation—H0: no serial correlation
P-value
0.23
0.00
Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation—H0: no serial correlation
P-value
0.33
0.00
Lagrange multiplier test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH)
H0: no ARCH effects
P-value
0.69
0.02
Cointegration likelihood ratio test
P-value
0.143
0.351
Cointegration Wald test
P-value
0.022
0.283
Breusch-Pagan independence of residuals test (optimal lag)
P-value
0.125 (lag 3)
0.159 (lag 1)
Multivariate Portmanteau (Ljung-Box) white noise in residuals test (optimal lag)
P-value
0.177 (lag 3)
0.196 (lag 1)
Omnibus test of multivariate normality of residuals (optimal lag)
P-value
0.795 (lag 1)
0.871 (lag 1)
KPSS test—H0: trend stationary
KPSS test statistic
0.113
0.275***
KPSS test statistic —H0: trend stationary in residuals
KPSS test statistic
0.116
0.121*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) test—H0: unit root
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 1)
-3.567**
-0.807
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 2)
-1.423
-0.923
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 3)
-1.351
-0.884
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 4)
-1.102
-0.785
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 5)
-1.543
-2.681*
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 6)
-0.651
-2.794*
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 7)
-0.667
-4.054***
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 8)
-0.472
-3.152**
Optimal lag length (Ng-Perron seq t)
1
7
Minimum Schwarz criterion at lag
1
7
Minimum MAIC at lag
6
1
Notes: Significance levels at which H0 is rejected: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Dickey–Fuller
Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) is the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) approach of unit root
testing and is preferred by many time series econometricians to the “first–generation” tests like that of
Dickey and Fuller. The DF-GLS test is similar to the augmented Dickey-Fuller "t" test, but has the best
overall performance in terms of small-sample size and power. Inferences drawn from the DF–GLS test
are likely to be more robust than those based on the first–generation tests. Hence, DF–GLS should be
your unit root test of choice, states Baum (2001).
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Table A.21
Determinants of the Share of Incumbents in the House of Representatives Reelected with at
Least 60% of the Votes, 1958-2000 (Hypothesis 1 Testing)
1
2
3
4
Percent of incumbents
0.26
0.61
0.61
0.13
(0.56)
(0.59)
(0.54)
(0.42)
reelected
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
Redistricting dummy
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.04)
-0.33
-0.11
-0.11
-0.00
Voter turnout
(0.24)
(0.26)
(0.23)
(0.12)
-0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.00
Bills per Congressman
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Percent of seats that changed
-0.43
0.08
0.08
1.06
(0.62)
(0.66)
(0.63)
(0.48)
party
0.02
0.02
-0.01
Unemployment rate
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Real GDP/capita
0.009*
0.009**
0.00
(in thousands)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.00)
0.68
-0.15
-0.15
(0.58)
Constant
(0.52)
(0.70)
(0.59)
(0.65)
P-value (F test)
0.32
0.26
0.02
0.00
R-squared
0.29
0.42
Observations
22
22
22
22
OLS
ARIMA
Estimation Method
OLS
OLS
(Newey-West)
(1,0,0)
Notes: Dependent variable: percentage of incumbents reelected with at least 60% of the votes. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Regression 3
utilizes Newey-West standard errors with assumed heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (up to lag 1) error
structure.
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Table A.22
Determinants of Combined Democrat and Republican Ideology in the House of
Representatives, 1948-2000 (Hypothesis 2 Testing)
1
2
3
0.33*
0.33*
0.38***
Percent of incumbents reelected
(0.17)
(0.18)
(0.03)
†
Redistricting dummy
-0.10
-0.10*
-0.02
Voter turnout
(0.09)
(0.06)
(0.06)
-0.004***
-0.004***
-0.0015***
Bills per Congressman
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.0004)
Percent of seats that changed party†
0.16
0.16
Constant
(0.15)
(0.14)
P-value (F test)
0.00
0.00
0.00
R-squared
0.64
Observations
27
27
27
2SLS-IV
Estimation Method
2SLS-IV
ARCH (1/1)
(Newey-West)
Notes: Dependent variable: Joint Democrat and Republican ideology index calculated as (|Dem| + Rep)/2.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
†
Instruments used in the 1st stage regression (both are negative and statistically significant at 1%) where
endogenous variable is percent incumbents reelected. Regression 2 utilizes Newey-West standard errors
with assumed heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (up to lag 1) error structure.
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